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SUMMARY 
My dissertation consists of three essays in the areas of real estate and 
corporate finance, with a particular focus on REITs and credit ratings. The 
research focus of my thesis is on the relation between corporate management 
and their credit ratings, as well as the real effects of credit ratings. First, I 
study how credit ratings affect REIT capital structure decision. Second, I 
examine how REIT property management decisions affect their credit ratings. 
Third, I study why do conventional firms initiate unfavorable (i.e., 
speculative-grade) ratings and what do they gain from such decisions. 
Chapter 2 studies the effects of credit rating on REIT corporate 
management, with a special focus on financing decision. This is the first study 
to examine the impact of credit rating changes on REIT financing decisions. 
Employing Simultaneously Equation Model to control the potential 
endogeneity problem, this study finds that REITs with the prospect of an 
imminent credit rating downgrade issue approximately 11% less debt net of 
equity as a percentage of total assets than other REITs. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that REITs are sensitive to credit rating changes 
because of their special regulatory environment. 
Chapter 3 studies how corporate management affect credit ratings. 
Different from existing literature on credit rating determinants, I take the view 
that credit ratings is a proxy for debt holder’s wealth and study the effects of 
property dispositions on the credit ratings of REITs. Based on prior literature 
of corporate asset divestiture and the characteristics of property dispositions 
by REITs, I suggest three possible mechanisms to link REIT’s real estate asset 
vi 
sell-offs with its credit ratings. These three hypotheses are utilization of 
sell-off proceeds, efficient asset allocation, and geographic level concentration. 
This study is among the first to study property transactions from the aspect of 
creditors using an instrument variable approach. I find that property 
dispositions improve REIT credit ratings through the channel of increasing the 
geographic focus of its property portfolio. 
Chapter 4 investigates the costs and benefits associated with initiating a 
“bad” (i.e., speculative-grade) credit rating. First, I find significant negative 
stock market reactions with an average cumulative abnormal return of -2.1% 
around the initiation date of a speculative-grade rating. In contrast, there is no 
significant stock market reaction for investment-grade credit rating initiations. 
Given the costs on equity value of speculative-grade rating initiations, I further 
examine firms’ debt financing, capital investments, and operating performance 
to see whether they benefit from disclosing their unfavourable ratings. I find 
that these firms engage in more debt financing and experience an increase in 
leverage ratio after the credit rating initiations. In addition to the benefits on 
debt financing, I find that these firms experience a rapid growth in total assets, 
capital expenditures, and earnings, while the profitability ratio remain constant 
after the rating initiations. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background  
Credit ratings play a critical role in financing and investment decisions of 
corporations. Corporate financing activities are directly influenced by its credit 
ratings. Corporations with credit ratings have easier access to capital from 
banks and other investors than the ones without ratings. The reason is that 
many institutional investors are not allowed to invest or hold corporate bonds 
below certain credit rating levels. Moreover, credit rating levels directly affect 
the costs for firms to issue debt or take loans. Corporations with lower credit 
quality will be required to pay more yields to bond investors than firms with 
higher rating. More generally, credit ratings can serve as a signal of firm 
quality and creditworthiness to investors, creditors, and shareholders. It can 
help to mitigate the information asymmetry between firm managers and 
outside creditors because credit rating agencies (CRAs) usually have 
information of their clients which is not publicly available.  
Although there are many studies on credit ratings for conventional firms, 
little attention has been given to the credit ratings of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs). Due to the unique features and regulations of REITs, issues on 
credit ratings of REITs are more interesting than that of conventional firms. 
First, credit ratings are of great importance to REITs because debt is one of 
their important instruments to finance their property investments. Due to the 
federal regulation, REIT’s capacity to retain earning is limited by the 90% 
payout requirement, which makes REITs more dependent on capital markets 
(debt and equity) than conventional firms. Second, there are several 
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REIT-specific features that make studies on the determinants of REIT credit 
ratings distinctive. To be qualified as a REIT, at least 75 percent of gross 
income must be from rents of real properties or interests from mortgages on 
real properties. The rating criteria for REITs emphasize particularly more on 
the quality and management of their real properties than for conventional 
firms. Thus, the active property transaction activities of REITs could have 
important impact on their credit rating levels. 
For conventional firms, existing literature has shown that credit rating 
levels matter in stock and bond markets. In particular, it is documented that 
worse ratings cause higher debt finance costs and decrease firm value (e.g., 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010). Given the potential costs of unfavorable corporate credit 
ratings, most of firms still choose to disclose their “bad” ratings even they 
have a choice to keep it confidential. Do these firms benefit from unfavorable 
or “bad” credit ratings? What are the costs and benefits of disclosing their 
credit ratings? These are all interesting questions that need more investigation.  
1.2 Overview of the Research 
My dissertation consists of three essays in the areas of real estate and 
corporate finance, with a particular focus on REITs and credit ratings. I 
derived my special interest in credit rating from the 2008 financial crisis, in 
which credit rating agencies played a controversial role. I have been 
particularly curious about the function of CRAs in financial market and how 
their ratings affect corporate management decisions, especially for real estate 
firms. REIT provides a suitable laboratory to study credit ratings due to their 
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unique pass-through legal requirement and high dependence on debt financing. 
The research focus of my thesis is on the relation between corporate 
management and their credit ratings. I study this relation from both directions. 
First, I study how credit ratings affect REIT corporate decision. Specifically, I 
look at capital structure decision. I found that when REITs are close to a credit 
rating downgrade, they tend to issue less debt net of equity than other REITs. 
Second, I examine how REIT management decisions affect their credit rating. 
In particular, I focus on REIT property sell-off decisions. I find property 
dispositions have a positive effect on REIT credit ratings, and this positive 
effect is mainly because of the increase in geographic focus level of REIT 
property portfolio after the sell-off. Third, I study why conventional firms 
initiate unfavorable (i.e., speculative-grade) ratings and what do they gain 
from such decisions.  
Specifically, in my first essay titled “Credit Rating Effects on REIT 
Capital Structure,” I study the effects of credit rating on REIT corporate 
management, with a special focus on financing decision. This is the first study 
to examine the impact of credit rating changes on REIT financing decisions. 
Employing Simultaneous Equations Model to control for potential 
endogeneity problem, this study finds that REITs with the prospect of an 
imminent credit rating downgrade issue approximately 11% less debt net of 
equity as a percentage of total assets than other REITs. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that REITs are sensitive to credit rating changes 
because of their special regulatory environment. 
The second essay, titled “Property Dispositions and REIT Credit Ratings,” 
studies how corporate management affect credit ratings. Different from 
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existing literature on credit rating determinants, I take the view that credit 
ratings is a proxy for debt holder’s wealth and study the effects of property 
dispositions on the credit ratings of REITs. Based on prior literature of 
corporate asset divestiture and the characteristics of property dispositions by 
REITs, I suggest three possible mechanisms to link REIT’s real estate asset 
sell-offs with its credit ratings. These three hypotheses are utilization of 
sell-off proceeds, efficient asset allocation, and geographic level concentration. 
This study is among the first to study property transactions from the aspect of 
creditors using an instrument variable approach. I find that property 
dispositions improve REIT credit ratings through the channel of increasing the 
geographic focus of its property portfolio. 
In my third essay, “Why Do Firms Disclose Speculative-Grade Credit 
Ratings?” I investigate the costs and benefits associated with initiating a “bad” 
(i.e., speculative-grade) credit rating. Firms that subscribe to credit rating 
services have the option to keep their ratings private or publicly available. I 
use a large sample of S&P’s corporate credit rating initiations from 1951 to 
2012 and find significant and negative stock market reactions around the 
initiation date of a speculative-grade rating. In contrast, there is no significant 
stock market reaction for investment-grade credit rating initiations. Given the 
costs on equity value of speculative-grade rating initiations, I further examine 
whether they benefit from disclosing their unfavorable ratings by looking at 
firms’ debt financing, capital investments, and operating performance. I find 
that these firms engage in more debt financing and experience an increase in 
leverage ratio after the credit rating initiations. In addition to the benefits on 
debt financing, I find that these firms experience a rapid growth in total assets, 
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capital expenditures, and operating profits, while the profitability ratio remain 
constant after the rating initiations. 
1.3 Research Contributions 
My dissertation contributes to literature in following aspects. The first essay is 
the first to examine the impact of ex-ante and ex-post credit rating change on 
REIT financing decisions. Using negative credit rating outlooks assigned by 
S&P’s as indicators of the closeness to rating downgrade, my study finds that 
REITs with the prospect of a credit rating downgrade issue less debt net of 
equity compared to other REITs. However, no similar effect is found for 
positive credit rating outlooks. Thus, it uncovers the asymmetric effects of 
potential credit rating change on capital structure decision of REITs. This 
study uses conditional mixed process model to control for the endogeneity 
problem related to credit rating variables. 
There are many studies examining shareholders’ wealth effect of mergers 
and acquisitions, and property dispositions/acquisitions. My second essay is 
among the first to investigate the wealth effect of property transactions from 
the creditors’ perspective. Using credit rating as a general measure for a firm’s 
credit risk and debt holder wealth, my study shows that property dispositions 
increase debt holder value by improving the level of REIT credit rating. This 
study uses instrument variable approach to control for the endogeneity 
problem associated with the disposition variable. This study further tests three 
possible mechanisms for the positive effects of property dispositions on credit 
ratings. I find that the increase in property focus after property sell-offs is the 
main channel. My study adds to the literature on diversification discount in 
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that it shows that diversification in geographic dimension “discounts” firm’s 
creditworthiness. 
My third essay aims to explore the costs and benefits of firms initiating 
unfavorable (i.e., speculative-grade) credit ratings. It contributes to the 
existing literature in several aspects. First, it contributes to the line of research 
on the economic role of issuer credit rating. While prior studies focus on the 
economic role of credit rating watchlist, my study examines the costs and 
benefits of issuer credit rating initiations and provides new evidence on the 
real effects of rating initiations. Second, my study adds to the literature on the 
information content of credit ratings. Different from prior studies on market 
reactions of credit rating level changes such as downgrades and upgrades, my 
study directly examines the stock market reactions of credit rating initiations. I 
show that the lower the initial credit rating level, the worse the stock market 
reactions. Lastly, my study provides new insights on firms’ decision to 
disclose a corporate credit rating. There are both significant costs and benefits 
for firms to initiate speculative-grade credit ratings. On the one hand, these 
firms experience negative stock market reactions. On the other hand, they 
benefit from rating initiations through raising more capital through debt 
financing, faster asset growth, higher capital investments, and greater 
operating profits.  
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents the first essay, titled 
“Credit Rating Effects on REIT Capital Structure.” This chapter explores 
REITs’ capital structure decisions when they are close to credit rating change. 
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In Chapter 3, entitled “Property Dispositions and REIT Credit Ratings” I 
study the impact of property sell-offs on REIT debt stakeholders. Chapter 4 is 
titled “Do Firms Benefit from “Bad” Credit Ratings?” In this chapter, I study 




CHAPTER 2 CREDIT RATING EFFECTS ON REIT CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Firm’s financing activities are greatly influenced by its credit ratings. A 
corporation with higher ratings is usually more able to get funding from banks 
and other investors than firms with lower ratings. This is because credit rating 
levels largely affect whether particular investor groups are allowed to invest. 
In addition, credit ratings directly affect the cost on firms to issue debt. 
Corporations may be required to pay more yields to bond holders for their 
lower credit quality than other firms.  
Since credit ratings are of such importance for firms, managers have every 
incentive to keep or improve the ratings by undertaking some financial 
rearrangements. As suggested by Standard &Poor’s, leverage is one of the 
most important rating criteria. Hence, capital structure change could be one of 
the main measures for firms to achieve good ratings. However, the study of 
credit ratings as a factor in capital structure decisions is relatively recent. 
Kisgen (2006) is the first paper that formally tests the impact of credit ratings 
on capital structure decisions utilizing a Credit Rating-Capital Structure 
(CR-CS) Hypothesis based on rating-dependent costs. The CR-CS hypothesis 
points that there are discrete costs and benefits associated with different levels 
of credit ratings. These rating-dependent costs and benefits directly influence 
managers’ capital structure decisions. Generally, Kisgen (2006, 2009) find that 
firms near a rating change and firms that suffered a credit rating downgrade 
adopt leverage-reducing behaviors to obtain a more favorable rating level. 
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Although there are studies on credit ratings for conventional firms, very 
little research has focused on the credit ratings of real estate investment trusts 
(REITs). However, because of the unique regulations of REITs, the credit 
ratings studies on REITs are of more interest than those on conventional firms. 
Credit ratings are more important to REITs because debt is an important way 
to finance REIT investments. REIT’s capacity to retain earning is limited by 
the 90% payout requirement and thus REITs are more exposed to capital 
market than conventional firms. This implies that compared with other firms, 
REITs should be more sensitive to credit rating change. 
  This study examines the ex-ante and ex-post effects on REIT capital 
structure from changes in credit ratings. Using a sample of 73 equity REITs 
from 1999 to 2011, I find that REITs that face the prospect of an imminent 
credit rating downgrade (as indicated by a negative credit rating outlook), 
issue approximately 11% less debt net of equity as a percentage of total assets. 
This effect is asymmetric in that positive rating outlooks do not have a 
significant impact on REIT capital structure activities. This research is 
expected to contribute to capital structure and credit rating literature from two 
aspects. Firstly, it takes the first step to study whether there are credit rating 
effects in REITs. Secondly, this research considers the omitted variable biases 
which are not addressed in Kisgen (2006). I mitigate the endogeneity concerns 
by using Simultaneous Equations Model.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. I review the literature that 
examines the impact of credit ratings on REIT financing decision. The 
‘Empirical Design’ develops the empirical models used to test the influence 
credit ratings have on capital structure decisions, both before and after credit 
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rating changes. The ‘Data and Summary Statistics’ describes the data used in 
this paper. The ‘Empirical Results’ presents my findings and ‘Conclusion’ 
offers concluding remarks. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Due to the unique regulatory requirements imposed on REITs, traditional 
capital structure theories may not be fully applicable in deconstructing the 
financing decisions of the REITs.  A common question asked in existing real 
estate literature is that since there are no apparent benefits to issuing debt, why 
do REITs maintain high debt ratios? In theory, the regulatory requirements 
governing the operations of REITs would lead to a more equity dominated 
capital structure. The issues1 raised in debating the determinants of REITs’ 
capital structure cover interest tax shields, tax-exemptions, bankruptcy-related 
capital costs, dividend payout requirement, a relatively opaque information 
environment, information asymmetry in the real estate sector, difficulty in 
monitoring and valuation of assets, restricted access to the full range of 
financing options and adverse selection of equity. The extant literature tests 
whether the trade-off, pecking order, and market timing theories are applicable 
in the context of the issues just described. The findings are mixed; empirical 
studies seem more in favor of market timing and trade-off theories (Boudry, 
Kallberg and Liu, 2010; Ooi et al. 2010; Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011), 
but there is still empirical support for the pecking order theory (Feng et al. 
2007).  
                                                        
1 The issues listed are not exhaustive. There is an extensive and detailed literature on the unique 
regulatory environment of REITs and capital structure decisions. Some of the papers include Howe and 
Shilling (1988), Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007), Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010), Ooi, Ong and Li 
(2010), Harrison, Panasian and Seiler (2011). 
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In practice, REITs are highly leveraged. Feng et al. (2007) find that REITs 
at initial public offerings (IPO) have 50% debt financing and this figure 
gradually increases to 65% in 10 years. Ooi et al. (2010) document that from 
1999 to 2002, debt financing is the major source of external finance for REITs. 
In their sample, 30% to 70% of the expenses incurred by these highly 
leveraged REITs are due to interest charges. The limitation faced by REITs to 
pay 90% of the earnings drives REITs to be heavily dependent on external 
financing. Ott, Riddiough, and Yi (2005) document that in their sample, 84% 
of the aggregate investment by REITs was funded primarily by equity and 
long-term debt. Brown and Riddiough (2003) find that REITs that issue public 
debt have a target long-run debt ratio in order to maintain a minimum 
investment grade credit rating.  Ooi et al. (2010) also find that most REITs 
have a target long-run debt level, although this target leverage behavior plays 
second fiddle to market timing concerns. Consequently, given the high debt 
levels, credit ratings should factor into the financing decisions of REITs. 
Credit ratings may influence the cost of debt financing as a signal of firm 
quality for investors
2, and through regulations that restrict firms’ access to the 
public bond markets or that affect the cost of holding a bond. Kisgen (2006, 
2009) demonstrates that credit ratings have a direct impact on a firm’s capital 
structure decisions. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) find that credit ratings related 
regulations that constrain investment in bonds affect yields; firms with better 
Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS)
3
 certification have a corresponding 
39 basis point reduction in their cost of capital. Faulkender and Peterson (2006) 
                                                        
2 There is a value to credit ratings if rating agencies have access to non-public information concerning 
firms’ probability of default or confidential information regarding firms’ strategic investment directions, 
and if through their own sources, credit agencies are able to provide independent and reliable measures 
of firms’ creditworthiness. 
3 Dominion Bond Rating Service is the fourth credit rating agency certified by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, in February 2003. 
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point out that a firm’s leverage is not only determined by a firm’s demand for 
debt, at the same time, a firm’s leverage may also be determined (or 
constrained) by a firms’ access to capital. In their study, after controlling for 
firm characteristics and the endogenous variable problem of a firm having a 
credit rating, they find that firms which have access to the public bond markets 
have 35% more debt. This finding highlights the linkage between capital 
structure decisions and source of capital, and lends support to my 
consideration for the importance of changes in credit ratings in firms’ capital 
structure decisions. 
Survey results gathered from various industries based in the United States 
and Europe indicate that managers rank credit ratings as the second most 
important factor in making debt decisions. Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 
392 Chief Financial Officers from the United States and Canada about their 
firm’s current practice in the areas of capital structure, capital budgeting and 
cost of capital. Over 50% of the respondents indicate two factors - ‘financial 
flexibility’ (refers to preserving debt capacity) followed by ‘credit ratings’, as 
important or very important in their decision to issue debt. ‘Credit ratings’ is a 
very important determinant in the debt decisions of firms in the utilities 
industry, firms with rated debt, and large firms that are in the Fortune 500.  
Similar to the findings in Graham and Harvey (2001), Brounen, Jong and 
Koedijk (2004) using the same survey, survey firms in United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany, and France. Their results show that financial flexibility, 
credit ratings, earnings volatility considerations are ranked higher than the tax 
advantages of interest deductibility. Anecdotally, many Chief Executive 
Officers and Chief Financial Officers routinely express their commitment to 
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maintain their firms’ current credit ratings, and at the same time, managers 
often petition rating agencies to obtain their views on the likely effects of a 
particular financing activity on their firms’ rating (Kisgen, 2007). The next 
paragraph provides a detailed discussion on the impact of credit ratings on 
capital structure decisions and cost of capital. 
Kisgen (2006) proposes a Credit Rating-Capital Structure Hypothesis 
(CR-CS) and formally investigates the direct effects of credit ratings on capital 
structure decisions by empirically testing the equity and debt issuances of 
firms near credit rating change. The CR-CS hypothesis states that there are 
discrete costs (benefits) associated with different credit rating levels. These 
rating-dependent costs (benefits) have a direct impact on capital structure 
decisions leading firms that are near a rating change (upgrades or downgrades) 
to issue less debt than firms that are not near a rating change. These 
rating-dependent costs (benefits) are different from the traditional costs and 
benefits (interest tax shields, costs of bankruptcy, etc.) based on tradeoff 
theory.  Rating-dependent costs refer to higher interest costs as a result of 
regulations that: (i) restrict investors’ purchase of bonds; (ii) affect the 
liquidity of the bonds; and (iii) result in higher regulatory costs through listing 
and disclosure requirements for the bonds. Rating-dependent costs also refer 
to the firms’ access to other financial markets such as the commercial paper 
market, and also costs relating to business operations, for example, an 
asset-backed securities transaction may require a specific credit rating of A- or 
above. Rating-dependent costs are discrete because the default probabilities 
and yield spreads for bonds associated with a rating category are assessed 
similarly for all firms pooled within a particular credit rating level. A firm may 
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be the best within a particular credit rating, say BBB-, but its’ credit spreads 
would not be lower than those of a firm at the bottom of a BBB- credit ranking. 
Consequently, firms near a credit rating downgrade would want to maintain a 
higher rating to avoid being pooled together with firms in a lower credit class. 
Likewise, firms near a credit rating upgrade would want to obtain the credit 
rating upgrade in order to be pooled with firms in the higher rating category.  
Thus, in the CR-CS prediction, firms that are near a credit rating upgrade or 
downgrade would be likely to decrease its debt.  Discrete costs could arise 
from ratings-triggered events that result in a required repurchase of bonds. 
These discrete costs are also important for a firm downgraded across a broad 
rating (e.g., from broad rating A to broad rating BBB) because of regulations 
on bond investment. To account for a firm being close to a rating change, 
Kisgen (2006) uses credit ratings designated with a plus or minus sign to 
indicate firms that are near a broad rating change. He further computes and 
ranks the credit score for each firm to capture changes in capital structure 
decisions due to potential changes across the micro ratings. He concludes that 
credit ratings have a direct impact on capital structure decisions.  Firms that 
are near a ratings change issue less debt (1%) than firms that are not near a 
rating change.   
Kisgen (2009) follows up on the argument that credit ratings have a direct 
impact on capital structure decisions by examining whether managers have a 
target credit rating.  If managers are concerned about credit ratings, they 
would reduce their firms’ leverage after a credit rating downgrade to regain 
their firms’ target credit rating. Correspondingly, since a credit rating upgrade 
is beneficial to the firm, managers will not make any significant changes in 
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their firms’ capital structure. The paper looks into the ex-post debt issuance 
behavior of firms following a credit rating downgrade and finds evidence that 
managers have a specific minimum credit rating target and that firms that were 
downgraded issue 1.5% to 2.0% less debt. Firms following a credit rating 
upgrade did not significantly change their capital structure activities. Brown 
and Riddiough (2003) conduct a detailed analysis of the various types of 
financial claims issued by REITs, and they find that firms that issue bonds in 
the public market have a target long-run leverage ratio in order to preserve a 
minimum investment-grade credit rating. The paper finds that the cost of 
issuing junk bonds is extremely expensive for REITs as there is a nonlinear 
jump of a 1% increase in cost of debt between investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds. In a later study, Ooi et al. (2010) find that REITs 
move their capital structure towards a long-run target debt level; REITs that 
are overleveraged would engage in leverage-decreasing activities, whilst 
REITs that are underleveraged would engage in leverage-increasing activities. 
However, market timing considerations still take precedence over maintaining 
a target leverage ratio for firms in their capital structure decisions.    
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) test for the impact of credit ratings on cost of 
capital, not through the information signaling firm quality conveyed through 
the credit rating classification, but through the ratings-based regulations, by 
different credit rating levels, that affect bond investment and subsequently the 
cost of debt. The paper investigates the impact of yields for firms that have a 
better DBRS rating, and finds that these firms have a 39 basis point reduction 
in their cost of debt.   
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2.3 Empirical Design 
My empirical models test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis tests the 
ex-ante behavior of firms near a change in credit ratings. The hypothesis is: 
firms close to a credit rating downgrade would reduce their debt levels to 
avoid being downgraded by the rating agencies; whereas firms close to a credit 
rating upgrade, to ensure that they attain the rating upgrade, would also 
decrease their debt levels. I test this hypothesis by regressing measures of net 
debt issuance relative to net equity issuance on variables that control the 
financial conditions of the firms, market timing opportunities, and dummy 
variables representing potential changes to credit ratings. The second 
hypothesis tests the ex-post behavior of firms after a change in credit ratings.  
The hypothesis is: following a rating downgrade, firms would want to 
decrease debt levels in order to regain their target rating; while a rating 
upgrade may not significantly affect firms’ subsequent capital structure 
because it is beneficial to firm and firm will not seek to reverse it (see Kisgen, 
2009). I test the second hypothesis by regressing measures of net debt issuance 
relative to net equity issuance on variables that control the financial conditions 
of the firms, market timing opportunities, and dummy variables representing 
changes in credit ratings. Table 2.1 describes the variables used in the 
regressions. 
 














                         . 
Dit = book long-term debt plus book 
short-term debt for firm i at time t 
∆Dit = long-term debt issuance minus 
long-term debt reduction plus changes in 
current debt for firm i from time t to t+1 
Eit = book value of shareholders’ equity 
for firm i at time t 
∆Eit = sale of common and preferred stock 
minus purchases of common and preferred 
stock for firm i from time t to t+1 
Ait = beginning-of-year total assets for 
firm i at time t 
Net debt issuance minus net equity 
issuance as percentage of total assets. Net 
debt issuance equals to long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt reduction 
plus changes in current debt. Net equity 
issuance is sale of common and preferred 
stock minus purchases of common and 
preferred stock. 
 
Credit rating explanatory variables:  
 
CRPlus Credit rating dummy variable. Equals to 1 
if a rating has a plus sign at the end of the 
period t-1, otherwise 0. 
- 
CRMinus Credit rating dummy variable. Equals to 1 
if a rating has a minus sign at the end of the 
period t-1, otherwise 0. 
- 
CRPOM CRPOM = CRPlus +CRMinus - 
ROPos Rating outlook dummy variable. Equals 
to1 if rating outlook is "Positive" at the end 
of the period t-1. 
- 
RONeg Rating outlook dummy variable. Equals 
to1 if rating outlook is "Negative" at the 
end of the period t-1. 
- 
CRIG/SG Credit rating dummy variable. Equals to 1 
if rating=BBB- or BB+ at the end of the 
period t-1. 
- 
CRBIG/BSG Credit rating dummy variable. Equals to 1 
if rating=BBB- or BB+ or BBB or BB at 
the end of the period t-1. 
- 
Downgrade Credit rating change dummy variable. 
Equals to 1 if firm have been downgraded 
at the end of the period t-1. 
- 
Upgrade Credit rating change dummy variable. 
Equals to 1 if firm have been upgraded at 






Firm Control Variables (Kit-1): 
 
Leverageit-1 Leverageit-1 = Dit-1/(Dit-1 + Eit-1) 
- Debt is book long-term debt plus book 
short-term debt; Equity is book value of 
shareholders’ equity. 
Profitit-1 Profitit-1 = FFOit-1/Ait-1 
+/- Funds from operation divided by total 
assets. 
FirmSizeit-1 FirmSizeit-1 = ln(Ait-1) 
+ 
Natural logarithm of total assets. 
M/Bit-1 Market-to-book ratio = (Ait-1 - book 
equityt-1 + market equityt-1)/Ait-1  
- 
Book equity: total assets minus total 
liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred 
taxed and convertible debt 
Market equity: common shares outstanding 
multiply by price. 
Aver_retit-1 Average of monthly total return over the 
previous 12 months. 
- 
  
Set of Dummy Variables (DV): 
 
Spec Dummy variable. Equals to 1 if firm has 
speculative-grade credit rating (BB+ and 
worse). 
- 
HighDIss Dummy variable. Equals to 1 if debt 
issuance is larger than 50% of total assets. 
+ 
   




RONeg Dependent variable in Equation 2. Rating outlook dummy 
variable. Equals to1 if rating outlook is "Positive" at the end of 
the period t-1. 
ROPos Dependent variable in Equation 3. Rating outlook dummy 
variable. Equals to1 if rating outlook is "Negative" at the end of 
the period t-1. 
Control Variables (all at the period t-1): 
Expected sign 
when RONeg is the 
DV 
Leverage Same definition as in Table 2.5. + 
Firm size Same definition as in Table 2.5. - 
Intcov EBITDA/Interest expense. - 
Profit Same definition as in Table 2.5. - 
CLdrawn Revolving credit lines drawn down as a percent of revolving 
credit lines available.                          + 
Cash/TA Cash and cash equivalents divided by total 
assets. 
- 




Notes: this table shows the detailed explanations for the variables used in the 
regression.  The derivation of these variables follows Kisgen (2006, 2009).  The 
vector Kit-1 is a set of firm variables that controls for leverage, profitability, firm size, 
firm growth, and firm returns. The M/B variable is calculated based on Baker and 
Wurgler (2002).  The vector DV contains two dummy variables that controls for 
speculative grade ratings and large debt issuances of over 50% of total assets. 
 
To examine the ex-ante impact of changes in credit ratings on REITs’ 
capital structure decisions, I adopt the framework in Kisgen (2006): 
 
                                          (1)                                               
 
where the NetDIssit is a measure of the change in firm i capital market 
decision at time t, using the amounts of net debt relative to net equity issued as 
a percentage of total assets. Net debt issuance is calculated by taking the sum 
of long-term debt issuance and changes in current debt, minus long-term debt 
reduction. Net equity issuance is calculated by adding together the sale of 
common stock and preferred stock and subtracting away the purchases of 
common stock and preferred stock. The components used to calculate the 
variable, NetDIssit, are based on capital market transactions. Using this 
specification I investigate REITs capital structure decisions directly related to 
changes in credit ratings and not related to firm performance. 
D_CRit-1 represents a series of different dummy variables used as 
indicators for potential changes or changes in credit ratings.  
Correspondingly, Equation (1) has several variations: 
 
                                                        
                     (1.1) 
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                            (1.2) 
                                                          
                              (1.3)   
                                                    
                                    (1.4) 
                                                      
                   (1.5) 
 
Consistent with the methodology adopted in Kisgen (2006), I account for 
both broad rating changes and micro rating changes.
 4
 Broad rating changes 
refer to a rating change from one broad rating to another, for example, from 
broad BB to broad BBB. This refers to the following scenarios: from BB+ to 
BBB-, BB to BBB- or BB- to BBB-. Micro rating changes refer to rating 
changes from one rating level to another, for example, from BB to BB+ or 
from BB- to BB. Broad rating changes are captured by the dummy variables 
CRPOM, CRPlus and CRMinus. These broad rating changes are interpreted in the 
context of ratings-triggered costs (a change in credit rating may lead to 
changes in coupon rates or a forced repurchase of existing bonds) and the 
impact of regulations on bond investors (certain investors may be restricted to 
purchase only bonds from investment grade firms). CRPlus contains the subset 
                                                        
4 Kisgen(2006) defines “Broad Ratings” as ratings levels including the plus, minus, and middle 
specifications for a particular rating. For example, B+, B, and B- all belong to the broad rating “B”. 
“Micro Ratings” refer to each individual rating level without categories. 
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of firms with a “+” rating, while CRMinus contains the subset of firms with a “-” 
rating. CRPOM contains the subset of firms with either a “+” or “-” rating. 
In my study, I use rating outlook
5
 as a proxy to measure the impact of 
changes in micro ratings applicable across all rating levels. These micro rating 
changes can be interpreted to be signals of firm quality. A rating outlook 
provides investors with an early indication of the potential evolution of a 
firm’s credit rating over a period of between six months to two years. As a 
result, rating outlook may provide a more imminent signal to investors about 
the current market evaluation of a firm’s quality than the assigned ratings 
designated with “+” or “-” notch. Rating outlooks can be “positive”, 
“negative”, “stable”, or “developing” 6 . Rating outlooks are included in 
Equations (1.1) to (1.4) that test firms’ behavior prior to a potential credit 
rating change. Rating outlooks are captured by the dummy variables ROPos 
that indicates a positive rating outlook leading to a potential rating upgrade, 
and RONeg that indicates a negative rating outlook leading to a potential rating 
downgrade. Rating outlooks are not included in Equation (1.5) that tests firms’ 
behavior after a rating change. Dummy variables Downgrade and Upgrade are 
                                                        
5 Altman and Rijken (2007), Michelsen and Klein (2011) adopt rating outlook in their empirical models, 
arguing that rating outlook supplement credit ratings by revealing supplementary and timely credit risk 
information. The use of rating outlooks differs from Kisgen (2006) use of a self-computed credit score as 
one of the explanatory variables. This self-computed credit score is calculated from a regression using 
the coefficients of explanatory variables that are considered to predict credit ratings. These explanatory 
variables comprise total assets, earnings, and the ratio of debt to total market capitalization. To some 
extent, although these variables capture some information related to a firm’s credit risk, they do not 
capture important but unobserved or confidential information which is not disclosed to the public but 
have important implications in predicting changes in a firm’s credit ratings. Conversely, rating outlooks 
are assigned by rating agencies that have access to information about firms that are not publicly available.  
Since these rating outlooks are public information, rating outlooks may also be considered by managers 
when making capital structure decisions. Therefore, I adopt the use of rating outlooks as a more reliable 
measure to predict changes to credit ratings, rather than a self-computed credit score in Kisgen (2006). 
6 A positive rating outlook indicates that a firm’s credit rating maybe upgraded. A negative rating 
outlook indicates that a firm’s credit rating maybe downgraded. A stable rating outlook indicates that a 
firm’s credit rating is to remain status quo. A developing rating outlook indicates that a firm’s credit 
rating maybe upgraded or downgraded. In my sample, there is no firm with a developing outlook. 
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used instead. Downgrade indicates that firm i was downgraded in the previous 
year, and Upgrade indicates that firm i was upgraded in the previous year. 
To isolate the effect of credit ratings in firms’ capital structure decisions, I 
use a vector of firm characteristics, Kit-1, to control other potential variables 
that may also explain firms’ capital structure decisions. The variables include 
proxies for a firm’s financial condition (leverage, profitability and firm size)7 
and market timing opportunities perceived by managers (market-to-book and 
average returns). Market timing proxies are included in the regressions as 
studies have found that market timing effects play a significant role in REITs’ 
capital structure decisions (Boudry et al., 2010; Ooi et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 
2011). In my regressions, I include a vector of dummy variables DV that 
comprises: (1) Spec represents firms which are assigned a speculative grade 
rating; and (2) HighDIss
8
 represents firms which issue debt that exceeds 50% 
of their total assets. I create the Spec dummy variable to differentiate the 
incremental difference in debt issuance behavior between firms with 
investment grade ratings against firms with speculative grade ratings. As 
outlined in the argument by Kisgen (2006), there are discrete costs (benefits) 
associated with different credit rating levels, and this costs/benefits disjoint 
may be most obvious in the change between investment grade and speculative 
grade ratings. This point is supported by Brown and Riddiough (2003); they 
find a nonlinear relationship between bond’s offer spread and issuer credit 
                                                        
7 When leverage is replaced by interest coverage (EBIT/interest expense), my key variables still have 
the expected sign with statistical significance. For firm size, I obtain similar results when using total 
sales instead of total assets. 
8 In my sample, there are 16 observations that have debt issuances that are higher than 50% of total 
assets. Examples of these REITs include Associated Estates Realty Corporation, BRE Properties, Inc., 
and Colonial Properties Trust. The main reasons for these large debt offerings are to fund debt retirement 
activities and invest in new acquisitions. Since the number of firm-years in my sample is limited, I could 
not afford to throw away the information contained in these 16 observations, hence, I used a dummy 
variable to isolate the effects of these large debt offerings. I ran regressions using a sample that excludes 
these large debt offerings and find that there are no significant changes to my results. 
23 
 
quality, more specifically: there is a 1% increase in bond yield for bonds 
issued by REITs with speculative grade ratings. To the extent that the 
specification between investment grade ratings and speculative grade ratings is 
too broad, I modified Equation (1.2) to Equations (1.3) and (1.4). In these two 
equations the dummy variables CRIG/SG and CRBIG/BSG focus on firms with 
ratings that border on the investment/speculative grade ratings. CRIG/SG 
represents firms with BBB- or BB+ ratings. CRBIG/BSG represents firms with 
BBB, BBB-, BB+ or BB ratings. The creation of the dummy variable, 
HighDIss, originated from concerns that large debt offerings may be driven by 
other factors such as financial distress, large investment projects or large debt 
reductions, rather than capital structure considerations. Figure 1 shows the 
debt and equity offerings by year, and I note that most of the debt offerings are 
predominantly below 50% of total assets. Finally, I control both year and 
property type fixed effects in my regressions. Diagnosis on the correlations 




I also consider the issue that credit rating outlooks may lead to an 
endogenous variable problem in my estimation. Firm characteristics affecting 
whether a firm has a positive, negative, or stable credit rating outlooks could 
also determine its capital structure decision in the next period. Some of these 
firm characteristics are not observable, but may be included in the error term 
in Equation (1). This would lead to a correlation between the rating outlook 
dummies,         and the error term,    . To address these problems, I 
                                                        
9 Results are not shown in the study but available upon request. 
24 
 
adopt a Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) to estimate Equations (1.1) to 
(1.4) and two probit models (Equations 2 and 3). The two probit models are: 
 
          
               
                          
   ,                (2)                                                                                           
                          
     
 
          
               
                          
   ,                               (3)                                                          
                          
     
 
where           
 
 and           
 
 are latent variables.        is a vector 
that controls for firm’s characteristics. According to Standard and Poor’s 
(2004), there are two major components of a REIT’s credit rating - Business 
Position assessment and Financial Risk profile. The basic business risk 
measures comprise firm size and property type. Lager firms tend to be more 
recognizable and more diversified, leading to a lower business risk than 
smaller firms. REITs that concentrate on different property segments 
(residential, commercial, hospitality, etc.) differ in business strategies, and 
correspondingly, differ in business positions. The financial risk profile 
comprises capital structure, cash flow protection, profitability, financial 
flexibility, and financial policy. I control these financial risk indicators by 
including leverage ratio, interest coverage, funds from operation, used credit 
lines, cash, and dividends per share respectively. Therefore, the variables
10
 in 
                                                        
10 These control variables are adopted from the empirical literature on credit ratings. I refer to the 
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vector,      , comprise: leverage, firm size, interest coverage (Intcov), the 
ratio of funds from operation to total assets (FFO/TA), the percentage of 
revolving credit lines drawn (CLdrawn), cash and cash equivalents divided by 
total assets (Cash/TA), and the total dividends paid per share (Div_share).  
Property type and year dummies are also included in the empirical tests. 
In my empirical estimation, I sequentially estimate Equations (1.1) to (1.4) 
with Equations (2) and (3) simultaneously. If I estimate Equation 1 
individually, the outlooks variables will be endogenous. However in the 
reduced form of SEM estimation, the outlooks variables are exogenous, and 
the right- hand- side variables are firm-specific control variables. In this way, I 
avoid the endogeneity problem in Equation 1 by estimation the structural 
equations. The estimation is performed using the conditional mixed process 
(cmp) estimator package in STATA. This cmp estimator is suitable for 
estimating multiple equations involving different types of dependent and 
independent variables (see Roodman, 2009). Equation (1.5) is estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. 
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
The annual data is constructed from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT 
database and SNL financial database. I focus on collecting information for 
REITs with a Standard & Poor’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating at 
the end of a fiscal year. This “corporate credit rating” reflects the firm’s 
current capability in paying its financial obligations. I further augment the 
credit rating proxies to include rating outlooks. The REITs are identified by 
                                                                                                                                                 
following papers: Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998); Amato and Furfine (2004); Campbell, Dodd, Hill, 
and Kelly (2012). 
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selecting companies with a SIC code of 6798 and I verify this sample against 
the database from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT). I also restrict my sample to equity REITs, and include both 
currently active and inactive REITs to avoid survivorship bias. My sample 
period is from 1999 to 2011. The selection of time period is based on the 
availability of merged data from SNL financial database and COMPUSTAT 
database and the requirement of a minimum number (20) of observations in 
each year. The sample comprises REITs with assigned credit ratings and at 
least two years of lagged data. Firm years in which the firm has missing data 
for the independent variables required for testing are also excluded. My final 
sample contains 73 individual REITs, with 495 firm-years. Table 2.2 
summarizes the property type distribution of the 495 observations. Most of the 
observations belong to retail REITs, which constitute 24.4% of the sample.  
Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics for leverage ratios (debt to total 
capitalization), ratings change, and rating outlook of firms by credit rating 
within the sample, and the number of firm-years by credit rating. On average, 
REITs have a high leverage ratio of 55%; this high leverage ratio is consistent 
with findings in Feng et al. (2007). This upward trend in leverage ratio as the 
quality of credit rating decreases is also reflected in the individual credit rating 
levels. Firms with an investment grade rating have a mean leverage ratio of 
53%, and firms with a speculative grade rating have a mean leverage ratio of 
66%. The sample distribution indicates that my findings may be driven 
primarily by firms with the BBB broad band of ratings. The majority (74%) of 
the sample is bunched within the BBB broad band of ratings with 368 
firm-years for firms with ratings between BBB+ and BBB-. The number of 
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firm-years at the two extreme broad credit ratings (the A and B broad bands of 
ratings) is limited.  However, the concentration of REITs within the BBB 
broad band of ratings is consistent with the findings in Brown and Riddiough 
(2003).  
The sample with downgrade and upgrade activity at each credit rating is 
rather small with 70 firm-years. After a rating downgrade, there are 19 
firm-years within the investment grade group, and 23 firm-years within the 
speculative grade group. Once again, I see the most activity in the BBB band 
of ratings. There are 82 firm-years for firms which are assigned a rating 
outlook. There are 19 positive rating outlook assignments and 36 negative 
rating outlook assignments for firms with an investment grade rating. There 
are 4 positive rating outlook assignments and 23 negative rating outlook 
assignments for firms with speculative grade ratings. 
Figure 2.1 Debt and equity offerings by year 
This figure displays the distribution of debt offerings and equity offerings as a 
percentage of total assets across time from 1999 to 2011. The debt offerings at a 
specific year are the total amount of the long-term debt issuance within the fiscal 
year.  The equity offerings at a specific year are the total amount of the sale of 
common and preferred stock within the fiscal year. 
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Figure 2.2 Average net debt issuance minus net equity issuance as a 
percentage of total assets by rating 
 
This figure shows the mean value of NetDIss (net debt issuance minus net equity 
issuance as a percentage of total assets) by rating. The sample is all US Equity REITs 
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Average net debt issuance minus net 
equity issuance by rating  
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Figure 2.3 Average net debt issuance and average net equity issuance as 
percentage of total assets by rating 
Panel A displays the mean value of net debt issuance (long-term debt offering minus 
long-term debt reduction plus short-term debt change as a percentage of total assets) 
by rating. Panel B displays the mean value of net equity issuance (sale of common 
and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock as a percentage 
of total assets) by rating. The sample is all US Equity REITs with Long-Term 
Domestic Issuer Credit Rating of Standard & Poor’s from 1999 to 2011. 
 
Panel A: Average net debt issuance 
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Average net equtiy issuance by rating 
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Table 2.2 Sample Summary Statistics: Property Type 
 
REIT type Percentage No. of observations 
Diversified REITs 10.5% 52 
Industrial REITs 4.4% 22 
Office REITs 13.3% 66 
Residential REITs 18.2% 90 
Retail REITs 24.4% 121 
Specialized REITs 17.4% 86 
unknown 11.8% 58 





Table 2.3 Sample Summary Statistics: Credit Ratings, Rating Changes, Outlooks, and Leverage 
 
Credit Rating Total Firm-Years No. of Firms Debt/(Debt+Equity) Rating Change Rating Outlook 
  
 Mean Median Std dev. Upgraded to  Downgraded to Positive Negative 
A 8 2 53% 57% 20% 1 0 0 0 
A- 29 6 37% 45% 25% 2 1 1 2 
BBB+ 88 14 56% 54% 10% 4 3 3 7 
BBB 153 29 54% 56% 14% 8 7 6 15 
BBB- 127 25 54% 53% 15% 3 8 9 12 
BB+ 25 6 72% 75% 11% 1 3 2 6 
BB 23 11 61% 64% 18% 4 1 0 5 
BB- 24 12 60% 59% 18% 4 6 1 4 
B+ 8 6 64% 70% 20% 1 6 0 3 
B 7 3 68% 65% 10% 0 4 1 3 
B- 1 1 71% 71% N.A. 0 1 0 1 
CC and D 2 1 92% 92% 3% 0 2 0 1 
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Total Investment Grade 405 76 53% 54% 15% 18 19 19 36 




55% 56% 16% 28 42 23 59 
Notes: this table summarizes the mean, median, and standard error of leverage; the numbers of firm-years for firms with rating change; the numbers of 
observations for firms with positive or negative outlooks; and the total firm-year observations by ratings in the sample of this paper, respectively. Leverage is 
measured by Debt/ (Debt +Equity), i.e. the book long-term and short-term debt divided by book long-term debt and short-term debt plus book shareholders’ 
equity. The sample is all US Equity REITs with Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating of Standard & Poor’s from 1999 to 2011. Both ratings and 
leverage data are at fiscal-year-end. At least three years of non-missing variables are required for conduction the tests of this study. Missing values of 
regularly used variables in the empirical tests have been excluded. 
 
Table 2.4 Sample Summary Statistics: Capital Activity 













Mean 17.31% 14.77% 0.16% 3.94% 1.03% -0.21% 
Std Dev. 17.79% 16.58% 2.87% 5.73% 2.08% 12.34% 
Min 0.00% 0.00% -30.77% 0.00% 0.00% -160.18% 
Median 13.11% 11.20% 0.00% 1.04% 0.00% 0.70% 
Max 201.86% 173.77% 47.15% 46.39% 15.53% 100.66% 
Notes: this table summarizes the indicated capital activity incurred value as percentage of total assets. NetDIss= Long-term debt issuance-Long-term debt 
reduction+ Short-term debt change-(Equity issuance-Equity reduction). The sample is all US Equity REITs with Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating of 
Standard & Poor’s from 1999 to 2011. All the capital activity data are at fiscal-year-end. At least three years of non-missing variables are required for the 
tests of this study. Missing values of regularly used variables in the empirical tests have been excluded. 
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Figure 2.4 Firm capital structure behaviour by rating change and rating 
outlook 
Panel A displays the capital structure behavior of firms with a downgrade, upgrade, 
or no change in credit ratings in the previous year. Capital structure behaviour is 
measured by the number of firm-years with leverage-reducing (NetDIss<0) activity 
for downgraded firms or leverage-increasing (NetDIss>0) activity for upgraded firms 
as percentage of total downgraded or upgraded firm-years, compared with firms with 
no rating changes. 
 
Panel A: Firm capital structure behaviour by rating change 
 
 
Panel B displays the capital structure behavior for firms with negative, positive, or 
stable rating outlooks in the previous year. The number of firm-years for firms with 
the corresponding rating outlooks and capital structure change behavior is shown as a 
percentage of total firm-years for firms with the corresponding rating outlooks. 
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Table 2.4 provides a closer look into the capital activities of the firms. In 
line with the high debt levels of REITs, long-term debt activities constitute 
more than 30% of total asset value, with 16% related to long-term debt 
issuance and 15% related to long-term debt reduction. Short-term debt takes 
up less than 0.1% of total assets value. Equity issues and purchases constitute 
a very small portion (5%). Overall, REITs are more likely to engage in 
long-term debt issuances and reductions in their financing activities. Figure 
2.1 shows the debt and equity offerings by year. I note that debt offerings 
predominantly constitute less than 50% of total assets. Thus, in my empirical 
model, I use a dummy variable to control large debt offerings of more than 50% 
of total assets. Figure 2.2 shows the average NetDIss by rating, and Figure 2.3 
shows the net debt and net equity offerings by rating. Overall, I note that firms 
with better credit ratings issue more debt and less equity compared to firms 
with worse credit ratings. This indicates the need to control the financial 
condition of the firm in the empirical tests. 
Figure 2.4 presents an overview of the leverage-increasing or 
leverage-decreasing capital activities by rating change (downgraded, upgraded, 
or no change) or rating outlook (positive outlook, negative outlook, or stable 
outlook). Figure 2.4A provides preliminary evidence in support that ex-post 
firms are concerned with target credit ratings and following a credit 
downgrade, engage in leverage-decreasing capital activities. In Figure 2.4A, 
the ex-post credit rating effect is predominantly for downgraded firms, while 
upgraded firms’ leverage change behavior is not significantly different from 
firms with no rating change. In Figure 2.4B, firms rated with a negative 
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outlook engage in more leverage-decreasing capital activities, but firms rated 
with a positive outlook engage in more leverage-increasing capital activities.  
2.5 Empirical Results 
According to the CR-CS hypothesis, firms near a rating change will adopt 
leverage-reducing financing policies. Consequently, this hypothesis predicts 
that for Equations (1.1) to (1.4), βi < 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and δ1 < 0. Analyzing the 
ex-post behavior of firms, the CR-CS hypothesis predicts that for firms that 
are downgraded, managers will adopt leverage-reducing capital structure 
activities to regain their target credit rating, whereas for firms that are 
upgraded, managers will not make significant changes to their capital structure. 
Thus, for equation (1.5), this hypothesis predicts that β1 < 0, and β2 = 0.  
Table 2.5 presents the results of the five equations. The first four columns 
display the results of tests on the ex-ante influence of credit rating changes on 
firms’ capital structure decisions. These four columns show the results from 
the SEM estimations of Equations (1.1) to (1.4). I refer to the coefficients of 
the micro rating changes: rating outlooks (ROPos, and RONeg). The coefficient 
for a negative rating outlook, RONeg, is negative and is both statistically and 
economically significant at the 1% level of significance. This implies that 
firms which face the prospect of a downgrade in credit rating in the near future, 
issue approximately 11% less debt net of equity as a percentage of total assets. 
The coefficient for a positive outlook, ROPos, has a positive sign and is 
statistically insignificant. Referring to the proxies for broad rating changes 
(CRPOM, CRPlus, CRMinus), I find that the signs for the coefficients are negative, 
as predicted by the CR-CS hypothesis, although the coefficients are neither 
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economically nor statistically significant. Referring to the proxies that focus 
on firms with ratings that border on the investment/speculative grade ratings -- 
CRIG/SG and CRBIG/BSG, I find negative signs, but the coefficients are neither 
economically nor statistically significant.  
Table 2.5 Credit rating effects on capital structure decisions 
 
Simultaneous Equations Model (only shown Equation 
1) OLS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
CRPOM -0.0043 


































   
-0.0015  
    
(0.0081)  
ROPos 0.1034 0.1032 0.1034 0.1032  
 
(0.0757) (0.0754) (0.0762) (0.0767)  
RONeg -0.1124*** -0.1143*** -0.1116*** -0.1118***  
 
(0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.0240)  
Upgrade     0.0092 
     (0.0183) 
Downgrade     -0.0135 
     (0.0181) 
Leverage 0.0102 0.0112 0.0107 0.0095 0.0231 
 
(0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0291) 
Profit -0.0045 -0.0047 -0.0010 -0.0053 0.5443* 
 
(0.2734) (0.2704) (0.2742) (0.2729) (0.2802) 
Firm size 0.0152** 0.0175** 0.0146** 0.0151** 0.0114* 
 
(0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0061) 
M/B -0.0661* -0.0631* -0.0662* -0.0650* -0.0687 
 
(0.0361) (0.0356) (0.0371) (0.0361) (0.0421) 




(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Spec -0.0106 -0.0070 -0.0108 -0.0103 -0.0130 
 
(0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0127) 
HighDIss 0.1185*** 0.1186*** 0.1177*** 0.1180*** 0.1114*** 
 
(0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0306) 
Constant -0.0831 -0.1089** -0.0810 -0.0875 -0.0761 
 
(0.0514) (0.0555) (0.0548) (0.0592) (0.0538) 




type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 495 495 495 495 495 
 
Notes: this table presents the estimation results of ex-ante credit rating effects on 
capital structure decisions of REITs estimated with a Simultaneous Equations Model 
(SEM) (Model 1 to Model 4), and ex-post credit rating effects estimated with a linear 
regression (Model 5). The dependent variable for all regressions is NetDIss (see Table 
2.1 for specifications). All the control variables have a one-year lag (as described in 
Equations (1.1) to (1,5). In this table, I show only the results for Equations (1.1) to 
(1.5), the probit models which are estimated simultaneously with Equations (1.1) to 
(1.4) are displayed in Table 2.6. In my estimations, I control time fixed effects and 
property type fixed effects by including year dummies and property type dummies.  
The R
2 
for the OLS regression in Model 5
 
is 0.2272. The robust standard errors are 
shown in the brackets. These errors are clustered by firm and are robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The fifth column of Table 2.5 displays the result of tests of the ex-post 
influence of credit rating changes on firms’ capital structure decisions. The 
fifth column shows the results of the OLS estimation of Equation (1.5). The 
coefficients for the dummy variables, Downgrade and Upgrade, are negative 
and positive respectively, and are not statistically significant. Although these 
results do not provide strong support for the CR-CS hypothesis, I do think that 
there are encouraging signs of support for the CR-CS hypothesis. The signs 
are: (1) the economically and statistically significant result from the 
coefficient of the negative outlook variable; and (2) the negative signs 
associated with the proxies for credit rating changes (CRPOM, CRPlus, CRMinus, 
CRIG/SG, CRBIG/BSG, and Downgrade). One major constraint faced in my 
estimation is the relatively small sample size. Referring back to my summary 
statistics in Table 2.3, my sample size of 495 firm-years is a relatively small 
sample. The number of available firm-years is 23 firm-years for the positive 
rating outlook; 59 firm-years for the negative rating outlook; 28 assignments 
for Upgrade; and 42 assignments for Downgrade
11
. 
                                                        
11 In the estimations for Equation (1.5), I replaced the profit measure with (EBITDA/TA). This gives a 
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Kisgen (2006) describes the discrete costs(benefits) associated with 
different rating levels, and Brown and Riddiough (2003) find that the cost of 
issuing junk bonds is extremely expensive for REITs as there is a nonlinear 
jump of a 1% point increase in cost of debt between investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds. In my results, I do not find evidence that firms with a 
speculative grade rating issue significantly less debt than firms with an 
investment grade rating. The coefficients for the Spec dummy, though 
negative, are statistically insignificant. The reason could be due to the 
financial restrictions of low-rated firms. Compared with investment-graded 
firms, firms with worse ratings have less financing options, and are more 
dependent on debt financing. They may not be able to reduce debt especially 
when they have financial problems. The result implies that ex-ante credit 
rating level does not have a strong effect on debt issuance. 
For control variables, I do not find significant results for leverage and 
profitability. Comparing the results from my estimation with results from the 
extant literature that examines the capital structure decision of REITs, I find 
that firm size and marketing timing opportunities (market-to-book ratio and 
average monthly returns) are statistically significant in explaining for 
variations in net debt issuances. The coefficients of M/B are significant at 10% 
level and firm size’s coefficients are significant at 5%. I find negative 
relationships between market timing variables and net debt issuances; this is 
consistent with the predictions of market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002) and results from empirical research related to REITs capital structure 
                                                                                                                                                 
larger sample size of 760 firm-years. I find the coefficient for Downgrade to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. Although the profit measure of (EBITDA/TA) allows working 
with a larger sample size, I the current profit measure (FFO/TA) because it is more widely adopted in the 
extant REIT literature. 
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(Harrison et al., 2011). Table 2.6 displays the results of the two probit 
regressions (Equations 2 and 3), which I use to account for the endogenous 
variable problem of credit rating outlooks. The significant rho parameter 
(atanhrho_12) indicates correlations between the errors in Equations (1) and 
(2). This means that I have to account for the endogenous variable problem of 
firms having a negative or positive credit rating outlook and their capital 
structure decisions on the firm’s leverage level. 
Taking a close look at the estimations the two probit models, I find that 
the variables, Profit, CLdrawn, and Div_share are statistically significant in 
explaining for variations in firms’ rating outlooks. The negative signs of the 
Profit variable from the estimations related to negative rating outlooks 
(Equation 2) indicate that as a firm generates higher earnings, the probability 
of obtaining a negative rating outlook decreases. The positive sign of the 
Profit variable from the estimations related to positive rating outlooks 
(Equation 3) indicates the opposite relationship. The high economic 
significance of the Profit variable suggests that credit rating agencies value 
firms’ operating performance when evaluating the firms’ rating outlooks. For 
example in Model 1, Table 2.6, a 1% increase of profit from 5% to 6% will 
decrease the probability of having a negative rating outlook from 0.057 to 
0.041
12
. For a 1% increase of profit from 5% to 6%, this will increase the 
probability of having a positive rating outlook from 0.189 to 0.242. The 
positive signs of the CLdrawn variable from the estimations related to 
negative rating outlooks (Equation 2) indicate that as a firm draws down its 
credit line, the probability of obtaining a negative rating outlook increases. As 
                                                        
12
 F(-0.8112- (0.05*15.4534))=0.05661165; F(-0.8112- (0.06*15.4534))= 0.04106983, where 
F  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. 
40 
 
firms draw down on their credit line, firms’ financial flexibility and their 
corresponding access to obtain capital from banks decrease. This would 
influence firms’ risk profile and thereby increases the probability of rating 
agencies assigning a negative rating outlook to these firms. The positive signs 
of the Div_share variable from the estimations related to negative rating 
outlooks (Equation 2) suggest that higher dividend payouts to the firms’ 
shareholders increases the probability of rating agencies assigning a negative 
rating outlook to these firms. This result is consistent with the agency theory 
on dividend policy. Overpayment of dividends could transfer wealth from the 
firms’ debt holders to the firms’ shareholders, thereby reducing the available 
assets to meet fixed claims from debt holders, and as a result, increases the 
firm’s default risk (Black, 1976; Kalay, 1982). However, a reduction in firms’ 
dividend payments does not correspondingly increase the firms’ probability of 
obtaining a positive rating outlook from the rating agencies. 
To summarize, my empirical study adds to the REIT capital structure 
literature by showing the significant debt-reducing activities when REITs are 
close to a credit rating downgrade. While existing literature has done extensive 
research on how traditional capital structure theories apply to REITs, I look at 
the credit rating effects on REIT capital structure change and provide new 




Table 2.6 Determinants of credit rating outlooks (results of Equation 2 and 3 from Simultaneous Equations Model estimation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Equation2 Equation3 Equation2 Equation3 Equation2 Equation3 Equation2 Equation3 
Dependent variable: RONeg ROPos RONeg ROPos RONeg ROPos RONeg ROPos 
Leverage -1.0020 0.1532 -0.9928 0.1698 -0.9837 0.1593 -0.9864 0.1657 
 (0.7649) (0.8799) (0.7572) (0.8748) (0.7655) (0.8764) (0.7648) (0.8714) 
Profit -15.4534** 18.2536*** -15.5531** 18.1331*** -15.5103** 18.1852*** -15.4852** 18.1657*** 
 (6.1335) (6.3164) (6.1086) (6.2768) (6.1471) (6.3330) (6.1731) (6.3407) 
Firm size 0.1435 -0.1034 0.1450 -0.1016 0.1415 -0.1039 0.1431 -0.1033 
 (0.1053) (0.1663) (0.1036) (0.1666) (0.1055) (0.1654) (0.1062) (0.1662) 
Intcov -0.2070 -0.0070 -0.2090 -0.0071 -0.2050 -0.0066 -0.2056 -0.0067 
 (0.1863) (0.0297) (0.1877) (0.0299) (0.1864) (0.0296) (0.1875) (0.0297) 
CLdrawn 0.0093*** -0.0077 0.0095*** -0.0078 0.0093*** -0.0077 0.0093*** -0.0077 
 (0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0026) (0.0049) 
Cash/TA -0.0531 3.5893 0.0821 3.3277 0.0073 3.4520 -0.0579 3.5162 
 (3.7195) (5.2485) (3.7484) (5.2094) (3.7412) (5.2004) (3.7440) (5.2195) 
Div_share 0.0857* 0.0134 0.0867* 0.0147 0.0855* 0.0144 0.0857* 0.0141 
 (0.0448) (0.0501) (0.0445) (0.0493) (0.0448) (0.0496) (0.0447) (0.0496) 
Constant -0.8112 -1.7953 -0.8272 -1.8025 -0.8097 -1.7905 -0.8200 -1.7957 
 (0.9936) (1.5509) (0.9903) (1.5481) (0.9997) (1.5468) (1.0029) (1.5486) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 
Arc-hyperbolic tangent correlation between errors of the three equations in SEM:     
atanhrho_12 0.9504*** 0.9706*** 0.9432*** 0.9443*** 
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Notes: this table shows the results of the two probit models in the SEM estimation (Equation 2 and Equation 3). The dependent variables are ROneg and ROpos 
in Equation 2 and 3 respectively. I control time fixed effects and property type fixed effects by including year dummies and property type dummies. 
Arc-hyperbolic tangent correlations between the error terms of the three equations in SEM are reported below the main results. The robust standard errors are 
shown in the brackets. These errors are clustered by firm and are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. ***, **, and * denote 




REITs are subject to unique regulatory requirements that, in theory, should 
lead to a more equity dominated capital structure for REITs. In practice, 
REITs are highly leveraged, with an average leverage ratio of 55%. With 
interest charges taking up 18% to 50% of the expenses, managers should 
concern with the impact of credit ratings on their cost of debt. To the extent 
that having a credit rating is important to REITs when sourcing for capital 
from the public debt markets, and also to the extent that a firm’s credit rating 
influences firms’ managers in their capital structure decisions, I examine both 
ex-ante and ex-post, the influence that changes in credit ratings may have on 
REITs’ capital structure decisions. 
Adopting the framework outlined in Kisgen (2006, 2009), I find 
asymmetric credit rating outlook effects on REIT capital structure decision: 
firms which face the prospect of an imminent credit rating downgrade 
(negative rating outlooks), issue approximately 11% less debt net of equity as 
a percentage of total assets; while positive rating outlooks do not have a 
significant impact on firms’ capital structure activities. This implies that 
REITs are more concerned with the negative impact of credit rating change. 
Perhaps, due to the relatively small sample size, I do not find strong support 
for the CR-CS hypothesis using the proxies suggested by previous literature 
(CRPOM, CRPlus, CRMinus, CRIG/SG, CRBIG/BSG, and Downgrade). However, I 
obtain encouraging results: though statistically insignificant, the coefficients 
for proxies of credit rating changes are negative. My study contributes to the 
empirical research on REITs capital structure decisions, by formally 
investigating the impact of credit ratings on REITs financing decisions, both 
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before and following a credit rating change. My results provide a guide to 
helping real estate practitioners understand the financing activities undertaken 
by REITs in response to ex-ante and ex-post changes in their credit ratings.
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CHAPTER 3 PROPERTY DISPOSITIONS AND REIT CREDIT 
RATINGS 
3.1 Introduction 
Credit ratings play a pivotal role in corporations’ financing and investment 
decisions. Since credit ratings directly determine the cost of debt financing, it 
is important for corporate managers to understand how their investment 
strategies affect credit ratings (Kisgen 2006). Due to their pass-through legal 
requirements, real estate investment trusts (REITs) have to pay out almost all 
of their income and must rely on external funds, including debt, to finance 
their investments (e.g., Ooi, Ong and Li 2010, Ong, Ooi and Kawaguichi 
2011). Therefore, REITs should be more highly motivated to pursue high 
credit ratings than general corporations.  
The existing literature shows that REIT property dispositions benefit 
shareholders (e.g., Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 2006). However, it is not 
clear whether property dispositions have a similar positive effect on debt 
holders or occur at the expense of debt holders’ wealth. To fill this gap in the 
literature, I use credit rating as a proxy for debt holders’ wealth and examine 
the effects of property disposition on the corporate credit ratings of REITs. 
Specifically, this study examines how REIT investment decisions, in 
particular, property dispositions, affect corporate credit ratings. In addition, I 
investigate the underlying economic channels and test three hypothesized 
mechanisms through which dispositions affect REIT credit ratings. First, the 
Utilization of Proceeds Hypothesis suggests that REITs may use sell-off 
proceeds to reduce debt and/or finance new investments such as property 
acquisitions, which have an indirect effect on credit quality. Second, the 
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Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis refers to the notion that managers retain 
the assets in which they have a comparative advantage and sell the properties 
that are not efficiently managed. Last, the Property Focus Hypothesis suggests 
that the geographic concentration of REITs’ property portfolio could be 
improved when certain real estate assets are sold, and this increase in REIT 
property focus can enhance its credit rating. 
The ultimate goal for every public firm is to maximize shareholder value. 
A REIT is required by federal law to distribute at least 90% of its taxable 
income as shareholder dividends. This dividend payout requirement means 
that REITs are highly reliant on debt to finance their asset investments. Thus, 
agency conflicts may exist between debt and equity holders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Myers 1977) in the case of asset transactions. Due to the 
potential conflicts of interest, the effect of property transactions on debt 
holders can be quite different from their effect on equity holders. 
Using the effective property tax rate as the instrument variable to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns, I find that property dispositions have a positive effect 
on REIT corporate credit ratings. Examination of the possible underlying 
channels of this positive effect reveals that REIT property’s geographic focus 
increases after property divestitures and that this increase in property focus is 
the main channel through which property disposition improves credit rating. In 
contrast, I find that neither proceeds utilization nor efficient asset allocation is 
a plausible channel underlying the relationship between REIT property 
dispositions and REIT credit ratings.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to my 
best knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effects of property 
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transactions from the perspective of creditors using credit rating as a wealth 
proxy. The existing literature has looked at the wealth effect of public 
bondholders after asset divestitures using cumulative bond excess returns at 
announcements (Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1996, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman 2003). This study complements these studies by examining the wealth 
effect on all creditors. Using cumulated disposition data over one year as the 
independent variable, I capture the aggregate economic effect of property 
sell-off on firm credit risk over a longer time period. 
Second, this study adds new evidence to the literature by studying the 
underlying channels of the wealth effect of asset divestures. I test three 
possible economic mechanisms and uncover the main channel ‒ property 
focus ‒ through which property dispositions improve corporate credit ratings. 
Finally, this study also adds to the literature related to “diversification 
discount.” Using REITs as a laboratory, I capture the effects of portfolio 
geographic diversification in addition to business/industry diversification in 
corporate finance literature (e.g., John and Ofek 1995). The evidence suggests 
that property geographic diversification is inversely related to firm credit 
rating, which implies that credit rating agencies value property geographic 
focus. 
3.2 Literature Review 
My study relates two strands of literature: credit rating literature and asset 
disposition literature. 
3.2.1 Credit Rating Literature 
Early studies such as Horrigan (1966), Pinches and Mingo (1973), and Kaplan 
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and Urwitz (1979) find that accounting data and financial ratios such as total 
assets, long-term solvency, long-term and short-term capital turnover, and 
profit margin well predict corporate bond ratings. While many prior studies 
have examined rating agencies’ methodology and credit rating determinants, 
not much research has investigated how firm management and corporate 
decisions affect credit ratings. In the other direction, some studies have looked 
at how credit ratings affect corporate decisions. For example, Kisgen (2006) 
examines the effects of credit rating on firms’ financing decisions and finds 
that firms near a rating change (identified by firms with a plus or minus rating 
notch) tend to issue less debt relative to equity to increase the chance of an 
upgrade or prevent a downgrade. Li, Chow and Ong (2013) further extend 
Kisgen’s (2006) work by looking at REIT capital structure and crediting 
ratings. By using credit rating outlook as a more accurate measure of the 
proximity to rating change, the authors find that REITs with the prospect of a 
rating downgrade tend to issue about 11% less debt net of equity than others. 
These studies imply that credit rating does matter when firms make financing 
decisions. Similarly, it is also possible for REITs to rearrange their property 
portfolio according to their credit rating level. For example, when a REIT is 
close to a credit rating downgrade, it may sell-property and use proceeds to 
pay down debt, and reduce leverage ratio. Therefore, the decision for REITs to 
sell a property or not may not be exogenous. Consequently, I pay special 
attention to the potential endogeneity problem when testing the property 
disposition effects on credit rating.  
3.2.2 Asset Disposition Literature 
While most of the literature on asset disposition focuses on its effects on 
49 
 
overall firm market value or shareholders’ wealth, only a few studies have 
examined the effects of asset disposition for debt stakeholders. Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta (1996) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2003) examine 
the wealth implications for bondholders and the net valuation eﬀ ect on the 
ﬁrm as a whole. Using cumulative bond excess return and cumulative stock 
return after the divestiture transactions to proxy bondholders’ and shareholders’ 
wealth, respectively, they find that divestitures are generally value enhancing 
for both stockholders and bondholders of the selling ﬁrm. However, these 
studies only look at one branch of debt — publicly traded bonds — while 
neglecting other forms of debt (e.g., loans, commercial paper). Therefore, 
what remains unclear to researchers is the effect of property transactions on 
the wealth of all the debt stakeholders. Furthermore, with the event study 
method, these studies can only capture the short-term announcement effects of 
divestiture transactions, while the long-term economic effects on debt holders’ 
wealth remain unexplored. 
In this study, I view credit rating as a general measure of firms’ credit risk 
as well as a wealth proxy for all debt stakeholders, which also allows testing 
the long-term economic effects of asset divestitures. While debt holders can 
estimate firms’ ability to repay debt obligations from public information such 
as financial statements, issuer credit rating by a third-party rating agency may 
serve as a better measure to evaluate the likelihood of firm default. The reason 
is that rating agencies have access to private information about the rated 
entities, which could be essential to the evaluation of entities’ credit risk and 
long-term firm value. Thus, the credit rating conveys important information 
about a firm’s distress risk for debt holders, especially after important 
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management decisions such as property dispositions in the case of REITs.  
The hypotheses on the effect of asset dispositions on debt holders’ wealth 
are motivated by the findings of studies that examine how asset divestitures 
affect firms’ stock return. In Table 3.1, I summarize the literature on asset 
sell-offs by the reason for disposition. I classify the literature into three 
categories based on firm type as well as asset type: corporate asset sell-offs by 
conventional firms, real estate asset sell-offs by conventional firms, and real 
estate asset sell-offs by REITs (property disposition of REITs). Of the three 
categories, a consensus in the literature is that asset/property divestitures tend 
to benefit sellers’ shareholders. 
Table 3. 1 Literature review of reasons for dispositions affecting firm 
value (stock return) 
Reasons  Corporate asset 
sell-offs 












Hite, Owers and 
Rogers (1987); 
























and Shaw (1993) 
 





For corporate asset sell-offs, shareholders’ wealth gains are mainly from 
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three mechanisms: efficient asset allocation, increase in focus, and sell-off 
proceeds utilization. Efficient asset allocation indicates that the asset has a 
better fit and is worth more as part of the buyer’s organization than it is as part 
of the seller’s. The reason for the buyer’s organization to have effects on the 
seller’s wealth is that some of the value gains by the buyer will be passed on to 
the seller through premiums in the selling price. This benefit is reflected in the 
seller’s abnormal return on the announcement of the divestiture (John and 
Ofek 1995). Studies on corporate asset sell-offs find that the abnormal returns, 
ranging from 0.5% to 1.66%, are attributed primarily to eﬃcient reallocation 
of assets to higher valued uses (Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer 1984, 
Hite, Owers and Rogers 1987; Jain 1985). As for focus, John and Ofek (1995) 
test business rather than geographic concentration. They suggest that selling 
the unrelated asset leads to an increase in focus and more efficient operation of 
the core business. 
The literature on corporate asset divestitures also suggests that sales 
proceeds represent a less expensive source of funding for firms subject to high 
agency costs of debt. In particular, Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) argue that 
given managers’ reluctance to sell assets, which is due to their willingness to 
maintain firm size and control interests, they may choose to sell assets because 
they view alternative sources of needed capital as not feasible or too expensive. 
The researchers find significant and positive abnormal returns for the payout 
subsample, but insignificant negative returns for the sample of firms that retain 
sales proceeds. 
Another stream of studies on asset divestitures of conventional firms 
specifically examines real estate assets sell-offs. Differing from the case for 
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conventional firms selling other kinds of assets, these studies have focused on 
tax benefits and asset undervaluation in explaining abnormal returns 
(Glascock, Davidson and Sirman 1991, Owers and Rogers 1986, Ambrose 
1990, Ball, Rutherford and Shaw 1993). The tax argument relates abnormal 
returns to the value of the depreciation tax shelter because sale of heavily 
depreciated property re-sets the depreciation schedule for the real estate. The 
undervaluation of real estate assets is due to the difference between book value 
and market value. Investors and analysts may underestimate the value of real 
property and the contribution of real estate to a firm’s total value. Thus, the 
selling price when property is sold may often constitute a positive 
announcement surprise. 
The effects of property disposition on REITs have scarcely been examined. 
Because of the special features of REITs, neither tax benefits nor 
undervaluation is suitable to explain the abnormal return for property sellers 
(Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 2006). McIntosh, Ott and Liang (1995) find 
that a subgroup of REIT sellers who declare a one-time increase in dividends 
to comply with the income distribution rule experiences a price increase 
reflecting this one-time dividend. Research by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2006) finds results similar to conventional firm asset sell-offs. They find that 
abnormal returns from REIT sell-offs are inversely related to firms’ operating 
performance prior to the sale. This result is consistent with the asset efficiency 




3.3.1 Why Do REITs Dispose of Property? 
The first reason for REIT disposing of property is to use the proceeds from 
disposition to reduce debt and/or fund new investments. Studies on non-real 
estate asset sell-offs by conventional firms have examined the importance of 
debt retirement as a motivation for the sale. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) 
show that those firms selling assets tend to be poor performers that have high 
leverage. Many REIT disposition announcements mention that one function of 
the proceeds is to pay down debt and/or make new acquisitions. For example, 
on October 27, 2005, the report of the Associated Estates Realty Corporation 
regarding the third quarter results indicated the following: 
In August, the Company completed the sale of The Triangle Apartments, a 
279-unit apartment community in Cleveland, OH, to nearby Case Western 
Reserve University (CWRU). The Company continues to manage the 
property for CWRU. The Company also completed the sale of Windsor at 
Metrowest, a 460-unit community in Orlando, on October 24. Proceeds 
from the sales of properties are currently being used to pay down debt, 
repurchase shares of the Company's stock, and to acquire or develop 
properties. 
Another reason for disposition is to increases the focus of property type 
and/or geographic location. John and Ofek (1995) emphasize focus as an 
important motive for divestitures of corporate assets. Lang and Stulz (1990), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Berger and Ofek (1995) all suggest that 
increases in focus result in increases in market value. Reducing geographic 
exposure is an important motivation for REITs to sell their properties, as 
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reflected in the American Campus Communities Incorporated Third Quarter 
2006 Earnings Conference Call on November 2, 2006:  
On our last call, we announced that we were in the process of marketing 
The Village on University in Tempe, Arizona for sale. This strategic 
disposition gives us an opportunity to accretively recycle capital into the 
acquisition opportunities Bill previously discussed as well as to the 
pipeline development projects. This disposition also mitigated market 
exposure in Tempe as we bring newer, better-located product on line in 
the ASU market. 
Finally, REITs may dispose of real estate in consideration of their overall 
operating strategy. For example, to enhance overall asset quality, REITs may 
sell assets with relatively low performance. This motivation is related to 
efficient asset allocation. 
 
3.3.2 The Mechanisms of Disposition Affecting Credit Ratings 
Corporate credit ratings are determined by rating agencies’ assessments of the 
probability distribution of future cash flows to debt holders. As the mean of 
the firm’s future cash flow distribution shifts downward or the variance of the 
future cash flow increases, the possibility of default increases and the firm’s 
credit rating will be subject to decline. According to S&P’s rating criteria for 
U.S. REITs and real estate operating companies (REOCs), a REIT ratings 
analysis has two major components. The first is business position assessment, 
which involves assessment and benchmarking of the company along key 
categories: market position, asset quality, diversification and stability of 
operations, and operating strategy and management review. The second is 
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financial risk profile, which refers to four elements: financial policy, 
profitability, cash flow protection, and capital structure and financial flexibility. 
The economic rationale for property disposition affecting credit ratings is 
shown in Figure 3.1. I combine the three classic theories on corporate asset 
divestitures (Lang, Poulsen and Stulz 1995, Hite, Owers and Rogers 1987, 
John and Ofek 1995) and the reasons for REITs to sell properties to provide 
possible linkages to the two main determinants of corporate credit ratings 
(business risk and financial risk).  




First, the Utilization of Proceeds Hypothesis suggests that REITs may use 
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investments. Proceeds utilization may have positive effects on a firm’s 
financial profile because debt repayment reduces the leverage ratio and 
profitable investment may increase future cash flow. However, this hypothesis 
may not hold in two other situations and opposite results may be found. For 
example, managers may undertake a risky investment to push up the stock 
price in the short term at the expense of debt holders. In the long run, this 
risk-shifting opportunistic behavior will eventually deteriorate creditors’ value, 
increase the firm’s credit risk, and lower firm value. Credit rating agencies 
measure default risk over long investment horizons and hence may detect 
these value-decreasing investment decisions even when they create temporary 
prosperity. Another circumstance is that the proceeds from disposition may not 
go to debt repayment or new projects. Instead, REIT managers may use the 
proceeds to pay dividends. For these reasons, the impact of disposition 
proceeds on credit ratings can be mixed. 
Second, the Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis mainly explores 
improvement in the real estate asset quality after REIT property dispositions. 
REITs can improve the overall quality of a property portfolio by disposing of 
the properties with poor performance, which can enhance a firm’s business 
position. Focusing on equity REIT property sell-offs, Campbell, Petrova and 
Sirmans (2006) find that abnormal shareholder returns are inversely related to 
a firm’s operating performance prior to the sell-off announcement. Their 
finding is consistent with their hypothesis that sell-off returns result from asset 
reallocation efficiencies.  
The last mechanism is through the Property Focus channel. There are two 
types of focus for real estate assets: property type and geographic location. 
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Firms can increase the level of business focus by selling the non-core 
properties. Also, because of location attributes for properties, the geographic 
level of focus may also be changed through property divestitures. John and 
Ofek (1995) suggest that asset sales could eliminate negative synergies 
between the divested asset and the remaining assets and will lead to better 
performance for the remaining assets. Reducing property diversification can 
increase operational efficiency and positively affect a firm’s business position, 
which in turn improves its credit rating. In this study, I hand-collect the 
geography data of REIT property and then test whether the level of REIT 
property geographic focus is affected after property dispositions. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
Credit ratings data and most of the financial data are from the SNL Financial 
database. This database provides end-of-year credit ratings assigned by three 
rating agencies: S&P, Moody, and Fitch. The long-term S&P credit rating is 
used in this research because very few REITs have ratings from the other two 
agencies. The property transaction data from SNL Financial is the aggregate 
contractual gross sales price of properties purchased/sold by the end of each 
fiscal period. The sample includes all the listed, operating equity REITs in the 
U.S. from 2000 to 2012. After dropping missing values for frequently used 
variables, I have 371 observations of 57 individual REITs. Other 
property-level data used to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are 
hand-collected from the 10-k filing forms of each REIT. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the mean value of variables by each credit rating 
level. I group firms into rating categories from A to B- as assigned by the 
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rating agency. Due to the small sample of REITs that have a credit rating, the 
sample does not exhaust all rating categories from AAA to D; 73.6% of the 
observations concentrate on the broad rating of BBB (from BBB+ to BBB-). 
Table 3.3 displays the correlation matrix of all the variables in the empirical 
tests. The variance inflation factor (VIF) shows values of less than 5.0 for all 
variables. The mean VIF for all variables is 1.57, which indicates minimal 
problems with multicollinearity. 
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Table 3.2 Sample summary by rating level 
Rating Score N Disp/TAt-1 Ln(TA) Leverage Age Intcov FFO/TA Beta DPS CLD 
 
 
   
% 
     
% 
A 1 2 0.0146 15.4153 23.7448 29.6000 3.1702 0.0980 0.9050 2.6060 34.1405 
A- 2 21 0.0486 15.9641 30.7951 21.3478 6.9817 0.0717 0.8866 2.4426 19.3671 
BBB+ 3 59 0.0410 15.7719 35.3104 21.0882 3.7561 0.0563 0.8994 2.3724 22.3129 
BBB 4 125 0.0525 15.2152 36.9787 22.8013 4.2490 0.0553 0.8507 1.9526 28.8287 
BBB- 5 89 0.0440 14.9568 39.3370 20.4298 3.1961 0.0486 0.9269 1.7776 29.8093 
BB+ 6 24 0.0549 15.2695 46.1269 17.5882 2.6779 0.0455 0.8726 1.3094 28.7411 
BB 7 19 0.0305 15.0126 41.5286 14.4783 3.2234 0.0555 1.0542 1.1234 34.9358 
BB- 8 13 0.0364 14.8445 38.2913 13.3125 2.9795 0.0500 1.1976 0.5264 18.4331 
B+ 9 13 0.0264 14.1698 56.5416 15.0588 1.9951 0.0365 1.0870 0.5056 34.1729 
B 10 4 0.0613 14.1352 59.6787 16.5000 1.0856 -0.0004 1.3571 0.4517 9.0400 
B- 11 2 0.0502 14.6881 62.8979 19.0000 0.8409 -0.0026 1.7412 0.0000 12.4444 
 
 
          
Total  371 0.0455 15.2001 38.9664 20.4338 3.6807 0.0524 0.9279 1.7691 27.5006 
Note: This table summarizes the number of observations, mean statistics of the key variable Disp/TA, and other frequently used control 
variables by credit rating level. Definitions of these variables are shown in the appendix. All these control variables are at year t, except 








Table 3.3 Correlation matrix 
 Disp/TAt-1 EPTRt-1 Ln(TA) Leverage Age Intcov FFO/TA Index_ret Beta DPS CLD VIF 
            1.24 
Disp/TAt-1 1           1.20 
EPTRt-1 0.1512 1          1.37 
Ln(TA) 0.1437 0.0431 1         2.42 
Leverage 0.2077 -0.0641 0.1134 1        1.24 
Age 0.1472 0.0176 0.0191 0.2175 1       2.46 
Intcov -0.1835 -0.0735 -0.1567 -0.6153 -0.3129 1      2.04 
FFO/TA -0.0826 0.0752 -0.1592 -0.5561 -0.0989 0.6322 1     1.33 
Index_ret -0.1263 0.0701 0.0141 -0.3022 -0.0132 0.0025 -0.0549 1    1.53 
Beta 0.2215 -0.1866 -0.1663 0.3227 -0.0734 -0.2929 -0.3368 -0.0494 1   1.33 
DPS 0.0821 0.1048 0.1604 -0.1736 -0.055 0.2532 0.2504 -0.2158 -0.2887 1  1.31 
CLD 0.1763 0.172 -0.201 0.287 0.1945 -0.049 -0.0175 -0.2159 0.0654 -0.0264 1 1.40 
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The empirical tests are carried out in three main steps. First, I test whether 
property dispositions affect REIT credit ratings. Second, I test the three 
hypotheses regarding the underlying mechanisms of the effect of property 
dispositions on credit rating to determine which one could be the explanation. 
Specifically, I regress the proxies related to the three channels on REIT 
property dispositions. Finally, I test the mediation effect of the mechanisms 
that possibly explain the relationship between property disposition and credit 
rating.  
3.4.1 The effects of property disposition on credit rating  
To test the determinants of credit rating level, I follow Blume, Lim and 
MacKinlay (1998) and Amato and Furfine (2004) and use an ordered probit 
model. The set of observed explanatory variables is related to the 
discrete-valued indicators of creditworthiness through an unobserved 
continuous linking variable. For the dependent variable, Rating,
13
 I assign 
discrete numbers from 1 to 11 to each rating level from A to B-, with higher 
numbers indicating lower rating levels and thus higher credit risk
14
.  
The main explanatory variable, Disp/TAt-1, is the aggregate contractual 
gross sales price of properties sold in the whole fiscal year divided by the total 
assets value at year t-1.
15
 Using a one-year lag for the disposition variable 
takes into the consideration that credit rating agencies may not adjust 
instantaneously to new information such as property disposition.  
The selection of control variables is based on a survey of credit rating 
research on all firm types (e.g., Amato and Furfine 2004, Altman and Rijken 
                                                        
13 I considered using credit rating change as the dependent variable. However, the number of credit 
rating upgrades and downgrades is too small (62 observations) to carry out statistical analysis. 
14 This is a standard transformation and is widely used in credit rating literature. 
15 The empirical results do not change when I use the disposition variable of year t. 
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2004) as well as the REIT credit rating criteria suggested by Standard & 
Poor’s (2004). A corporate credit rating has two major components: business 
position and financial risk. For business position assessment, I control firm 
size (Ln (TA)), firm age (Age), and systematic risk (Beta). Firm size value is 
the log form of total assets: Ln (TA). Since larger firms naturally face lower 
risk, Ln (TA) is expected to have positive effects on credit ratings. REITs with 
longer histories may have established a better position in the capital market 
than younger REITs and thus are expected to have lower credit risk. Therefore, 
I expect Age to have positive effects on credit ratings. Larger systematic risk 
implies larger equity risk, which suggests that a firm would be less able to 
service its debt. Hence, I expect Beta to have negative effects on ratings. 
With respect to financial risk, I employ five measures (DPS, FFO/TA, 
Intcov, Leverage, CLD) to control the REIT financial profile related to the 
following aspects: financial policy, profitability, cash flow protection, capital 
structure, and financial flexibility. DPS refers to dividend per share. Firms that 
pay high dividends tend to have higher expectations of future cash flow and 
superior ability to meet debt obligation. Therefore, I predict that DPS is 
positively related to credit rating levels. FFO/TA, defined as funds from 
operations divided by total assets, captures REIT profitability. High earnings 
indicate a firm’s ability to generate cash flow as well as the quality of the 
firm’s assets. I expect FFO/TA to be positively related to credit rating levels. 
Furthermore, I also expect interest coverage ratio (Intcov) to have a positive 
effect on ratings. Leverage is a direct measure of the magnitude of debt 
obligations. An increase in leverage should lead to high credit risk and thus a 
lower credit rating. The credit line drawn divided by the available credit line 
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(CLD) is negatively related to a firm’s financial flexibility. As firms draw 
down their credit line, their ability to meet short-term debt obligations will be 
constrained. Thus, I expect a drawdown to have a negative impact on credit 
ratings.  
In addition to the above control variables, I also include REIT property 
type: Office, Industrial, Residential, Retail, Diversified, and Other. Time fixed 
effects are included in all empirical tests. Moreover, I add market index return 
(Index_ret) as one of the control variables to see whether the general market 
environment affects ratings and whether rating agencies can really “see 
through cycle.” A more detailed description of all variables can be found in the 
appendix.  
As discussed in the Literature Review, a potential endogeneity problem is 
associated with the property disposition variable. The decision to sell a 
property or not may be influenced by a firm’s credit rating level. To alleviate 
this endogeneity concern and obtain unbiased estimates, I employ an 
instrument variable (IV) approach and simultaneously estimate the first stage 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the second stage ordered probit 
model together using simultaneous equations modeling (SEM).
16
  
A good IV should be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, 
i.e. Disp/TAt-1, and should not be correlated with the dependent variable, i.e.   
Rating. I use the effective property tax rate (EPTR), calculated as tax expenses 
on real estate assets divided by net real estate investment, as the IV. EPTR 
meets the condition of a good IV. It reflects the marginal tax cost for a REIT 
                                                        
16 I adopt the conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator to simultaneously estimate the two equations 
together. This estimator is suitable for estimating multiple equations involving different types of 
dependent and independent variables. It can fit many seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), 
simultaneous equations, and IV models (Roodman 2009). 
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maintaining its property portfolio. This rate is unrelated to firm characteristics 
since the tax rate is determined by location rather than quality of properties
17
. 
Therefore, EPTR is unlikely to have a direct effect on REIT credit rating 
levels. On the other hand, EPTR is related to the decision to divest properties, 
as a high tax rate means high costs on property maintenance. These attributes 
of EPTR make it a valid instrument variable for property disposition.  
3.4.2 Mechanisms of the relationship between property disposition and 
credit rating 
As discussed in earlier sections, I propose three possible mechanisms through 
which disposition can affect REIT credit ratings. I first test whether selling 
real estate assets affects the three factors important for credit rating ‒ proceeds 
use, efficient asset allocation, and property focus ‒ by regressing the variables 
(Debt_ratio, Acq/TA, ROAA, NOI/TA, FFO/TA, HHI) related to one of the 
three credit rating factors on the lag disposition variable (Disp/TAt-1) along 
with control variables (Ln(TA), Leverage, Age, FFO/TA). For all these 
regressions, I control the omitted variable endogeneity problem using the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Again, I use EPTR as the 
instrument variable since it is correlated with the disposition variable 
Disp/TAt-1 and is not correlated with other firm characteristics.  
To test the Utilization of Proceeds Hypothesis, I assume a one-year lag in 
utilization of the disposition proceeds; the proceeds will be reflected in the 
next year’s acquisition or debt retirement. For this reason, I take a one-year lag 
                                                        
17 Real estate property is not taxed at the federal level. Real estate taxes are levied by the local 
municipalities and counties of the U.S. states. The rates vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as well as 
the methods of assessing the value of the property. Most jurisdictions impose the tax on some stated 
portion of fair market value, referred to as an assessment ratio. This ratio may vary depending on the 
type or use of the property. 
65 
 
in the disposition variable. Debt_ratio is measured by current-year book value 
of debt divided by debt value in the previous year. Acq/TA is the aggregate 
contractual gross sales price of properties purchased divided by total assets at 
the end of the current fiscal year. I also use the interaction term Disp*Levt-1 
instead of Disp/TAt-1 since REITs with higher leverage are more likely to use 
proceeds to pay down debt. The Proceeds Hypothesis predicts that the 
disposition variable has a negative coefficient with Debt_ratio as the 
dependent variable and a positive coefficient with Acq/TA as the dependent 
variable. 
Return on average assets (ROAA) and net operating income (NOI/TA) are 
measures of property quality and firm profitability. I also use funds from 
operations (FFO/TA) to specifically capture REIT performance. If the 
properties sold are those that cannot be efficiently managed or those that 
underperform, the overall quality of the property portfolio will be improved 
after the dispositions. Therefore, a positive coefficient for disposition when 
ROAA, NOI/TA, or FFO/TA is the dependent variable would support the 
Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis.  
To test the Property Focus Hypothesis, I calculate the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure the focus level of a firms’ 
property portfolio. This index is a standard measure of diversification and is 
the sum of weighted average ratios, as suggested by John and Ofek (1995) and 
Capozza and Seguin (1999). I only focus on the geographic index and do not 
calculate the property-type index because of the extremely small number of 
diversified REITs (only four) in the sample.  
The geographic HHI is calculated as follows: 
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HHI=   
   
 ,                  (1) 
where Si is the proportion of the property portfolio invested in region i. I 
classify the regions into 10 divisions according to the US Census Bureau: New 
England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South 
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, and 
Foreign. The weight to calculate the index is the amount of money invested in 
each of the 10 regions. If this investment information is not available, I use the 
area of properties (in square feet) or number of rooms/apartments as the 
second choice. However, if none of the above information can be found in a 
firm’s 10-k filing forms, I use the number of properties as the last choice. 
Values of HHI range from 0 to 1. A high value of this index indicates a high 
level of focus. The Property Focus Hypothesis indicates that property 
divestiture can lower the level of geographic diversification and thus have a 
positive coefficient with HHI as the dependent variable. 
3.4.3 The mediation effects of the possible mechanism  
I test the mediation effect of the possible underlying mechanisms that link 
property disposition to credit rating by adopting the methodology proposed in 
social psychological research. Baron and Kenny (1986) provide a specific 
compendium of analytic procedures to identify mediator. I only test the 
channel on which the earlier analyses show that disposition has an effect. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), there are three steps to prove 
mediation effects: First, test whether the independent variable affects the 
mediator; second, test whether the independent variable affects the dependent 
variable; and third, test whether the mediator affects the dependent variable. 
To establish mediation, I need to get significant results in the predicted 
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direction from all three tests. Step one and step two were tested earlier. I tested 
whether the independent variable (Disp/TA) significantly affects mediators 
(Debt_ratio, Acq/TA, ROAA, NOI/TA, FFO/TA, HHI) and the dependent 
variable (Rating). I conduct the third test to examine whether the mediators 
affect the dependent variable (Rating). I employ a mixed process model with 
the IV approach to get the estimated coefficient of the specific channel 
through which disposition affects credit rating. This estimation is conducted 
with SEM using a conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator. 
So far, by carrying out the three-step test I can obtain results showing 
whether the sale of properties affects credit rating through a certain 
mechanism. However, it is still not clear to what extent a mediator can explain 
the property disposition effects on credit rating. To identify precisely how 
much of the disposition effects on credit ratings come through the specific 
mediator, I carry out an identification test as a fourth step. I tackle the 
identifying problem by using the predicted mediation variable from the 
independent variable (Disp/TA). That is, to use disposition to predict the value 
of the intermediate variable and then use the predicted value to get an estimate 
of disposition’s effect on credit rating. Specifically, I first conduct the same 
test as in the second part of empirical design, that is, regress mediation 
variable(s) on the property sell-off variable (Disp/TAt-1) and other firm 
characteristic variables using EPTR as the IV. Then, based on those estimation 
results, I obtain the predicted value of the mediator, which captures the effects 
of property disposition. In the next step, I replace the disposition variable with 
this predicted mediation variable in the ordered probit model, which I 
elaborate in the first part of the empirical design. In this way, the coefficient of 
68 
 
the predicted mediator variable can reflect how much of the mediation effects 
can be attributed to the specific channel. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 The effects of property disposition on credit rating 
Table 3.4 shows the results of testing disposition effects on REIT credit rating 
without using the instrument variable. I obtain significant coefficients for the 
disposition variable in all the conditions of different specifications of time and 
property-type fixed effects. The significant negative coefficient of Disp/TAt-1 
indicates that selling real estate assets may improve the credit rating of REITs 
in the next period. This result does not consider the endogeneity problem 
associated with property dispositions. If firms’ decisions to sell properties are 
affected by their credit rating level, the estimated coefficient of the disposition 
variable could be biased.  
Table 3.4 Test disposition effects on REIT credit rating without 
instrument variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ratingt Ratingt Ratingt Ratingt 
     
Disp/TAt-1 -3.3189*** -3.5228*** -3.0237*** -3.8087*** 
 (1.0243) (0.9506) (0.9880) (0.9951) 
Ln(TA)t -0.8575*** -0.8360*** -0.8873*** -0.8090*** 
 (0.0851) (0.0862) (0.0853) (0.0862) 
Leveraget 0.0439*** 0.0349*** 0.0422*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0062) 
Aget -0.0358*** -0.0365*** -0.0333*** -0.0390*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0097) 
Intcovt 0.0319*** 0.0092 0.0137 0.0271*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.0095) 
FFO/TAt -17.3127*** -18.0731*** -16.1228*** -19.2049*** 
 (4.4050) (4.3734) (4.1935) (4.5897) 
Index_rett 1.9391 0.3875 1.9081 0.4170 
 (1.4812) (0.3454) (1.4905) (0.3446) 
Betat 2.3020*** 1.8567*** 2.0139*** 2.1611*** 
 (0.3457) (0.3325) (0.3386) (0.3391) 
DPSt -0.3335*** -0.3951*** -0.3538*** -0.3717*** 
 (0.0609) (0.0623) (0.0634) (0.0599) 
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CLDt -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) 
year Y N Y N 
property type Y N N Y 
Observations 371 371 371 371 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2768 0.2531 0.2648 0.2655 
Note: This table shows the ordered probit estimation results for property disposition 
effects on credit rating without using the instrument variable. The dependent variable 
is Ratingt. Definitions of the variables are shown in the appendix. In model 1, time 
fixed effects and property type fixed effects are controlled by including year dummies 
and property type dummies. In model 3, only time fixed effects are controlled, while 
in model 4 only property type fixed effects are controlled. The robust standard errors 
are shown in brackets. These errors are clustered by firm and are robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 reports the SEM estimation results of disposition effects on 
credit rating, including the instrument variable to control the endogeneity 
problem. Model 1 shows the results of the first stage OLS regression using 
EPTR as the instrument variable. Consistent with the expectations, the 
coefficient of EPTR is significantly positive, which implies that a high 
property tax rate increases the divestiture of real estate assets.  
In model 2, the coefficient of Disp/TA is negative with statistical 
significance at the 1% level. The negative coefficient reflects a positive effect 
of dispositions on credit rating as the dependent variable is a measure of credit 
risk. The economic significance of the disposition variable is also sizable. 
Take BBB- as an example; a one percentage point increase in the cumulated 
value of the property sell-off will increase the possibility of obtaining a 
minimum investment-grade rating (i.e., BBB-) rather than a lower rating by 
0.73%. This evidence suggests that property disposition has a positive effect 
on the subsequent credit rating level of REITs. This result is robust as I have 
controlled the endogeneity problem. The finding implies that property sell-offs 
do affect debt holders’ benefit. After property dispositions, REIT credit rating 
levels may improve. This means that after REITs sell properties, the possibility 
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of creditors’ wealth deterioration may be reduced in terms of a lower credit 
risk evaluation from credit rating agencies.  




Model 2 Model 1 
 











Ln(TA)t -0.8058*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0053) 
Leveraget 0.0463*** -0.0000 
 (0.0070) (0.0004) 
Aget -0.0359*** 0.0012 
 
(0.0097) (0.0007) 
Intcovt 0.0336*** -0.0009 
 
(0.0112) (0.0051) 
FFO/TAt -19.4788*** 0.0641 
 
(4.5668) (0.2855) 
Index_rett 2.4284* 0.0609 
 
(1.4565) (0.0701) 
Betat 2.3105*** 0.0785*** 
 
(0.3337) (0.0200) 
DPSt -0.3202*** 0.0002 
 
(0.0626) (0.0034) 








year Y Y 
property type Y Y 
Observations 371 371 
 atanhrho_12 0.5371*** 
 
(0.1410) 
Note: This table shows the SEM estimation results for property disposition effects on 
credit rating with EPTRt-1 as the instrument variable. The dependent variables are 
Rating and Disp/TAt-1 in model 2 and 1, respectively. Definitions of the variables are 
shown in the appendix. I control time fixed effects and property type fixed effects by 
including year dummies and property type dummies. Arc-hyperbolic tangent 
correlations between the error terms of the two equations in the SEM are reported 
below the main results. The robust standard errors are shown in brackets. These errors 
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are clustered by firm and are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm 
correlation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Most coefficients of the control variables are highly significant and have 
the expected sign (Ln(TA), Leverage, Age, FFO/TA, Beta, DPS). The 
significant rho parameter (atanhrho_12) indicates that the correlation between 
the error terms in the two equations is significant. Therefore, it is necessary to 
use the IV approach to control for the endogeneity problem. 
The empirical results are consistent with the existing literature studying 
the effects of asset disposition on stakeholders’ wealth. Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta (1996) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2003) find that 
corporate asset divestitures benefit both stockholders and bondholders, as 
shown by event study results. The results provide further evidence of positive 
long-term effects of dispositions (with special attention to real estate assets) on 
debt holders’ wealth. Taking the results of this study and those from the 
literature on asset divestitures and stockholders’ wealth together, we may infer 
that property sell-offs increase both shareholders’ and debt holders’ value. 
According to the results, REIT managers are not likely to make property 
disposition decisions at the risk of damaging creditors’ benefits. 
3.5.2 Mechanisms of the relationship between property disposition and 
credit rating 
 
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results of the three underlying mechanisms 
that explain the relationship between sale of property and credit rating. In this 
part, I test which mediator variables are affected by property dispositions. I 
regress the three mediation variables on the disposition variable to see whether 
selling properties changes the utilization of proceeds, the quality of properties, 
or the geographic focus level of property portfolios. I find that, consistent with 
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the Property Focus Hypothesis, the coefficient on disposition in model 3 is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. This evidence suggests that property 
dispositions improve the property geographic focus of REITs. In contrast, the 
coefficients of the disposition variable are not significant in any of the 
remaining models, although I obtain the expected signs for all regressions 
except in model 7. This finding implies that the change in geographic focus of 
the overall property portfolio after property divestiture is the only possible 
channel of the three to explain the positive effects of REIT property 
dispositions on credit ratings. 
I found no effect of dispositions on proceeds utilization. One possible 
reason is that the proceeds from disposition may not go to debt repayment or 
property acquisitions and thus the coefficients are not significant with the 
expected signs. A REIT may use a large portion or all of its proceeds after 
dispositions to pay dividends to shareholders, as REITs have a compulsory 
dividend payout requirement. Supportive evidence can be found in both 
industry anecdotal reports and academic literature. For example, Charles R. 
Elliott, chief financial officer of Roberts Realty Investors, Inc. (Amex: RPI), 
stated: “The best way to create value for our shareholders is to periodically 
sell our apartment communities in order to make distributions to our 
shareholders from the sales proceeds.” McIntosh, Ott and Liang (1995) 
suggest that sales of property can create taxable gains that increase REIT 
dividend distribution. They find that the market reacts positively when 
disposition is followed with an increase in REIT dividends. Under these 
circumstances, the proceeds from selling properties may not go to debt 
repayment or new projects. Instead, REIT managers may use the proceeds for 
73 
 
dividend distributions. Therefore, the coefficient of disposition may not be 
significant when testing the Utilization of Proceeds Hypothesis.  
Table 3.6 Disposition and three mechanisms 
 
 Efficient Asset 
Allocation 
Focus Proceeds Utilization 









        
Disp/TAt-
1 
24.1905 0.0822 0.0754 6.0009** -0.3886  -0.0895 
 (18.7897) (0.1807) (0.2234) (2.6207) (1.8575)  (0.5971) 
Disp*Lev
t-1 
     -0.0152  




-0.0020 -0.0802 -0.0062 -0.0032 0.0177 







-0.0005 0.0009 0.0018 -0.0010 
 (0.0189) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0008) 
Aget 0.0269 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0029 0.0014 






 4.5929 0.9608 0.9063 0.2850 










 (3.2687) (0.0352) (0.0369) (0.8340) (0.4088) (0.3986) (0.1908) 
        
Observat
ions 
232 199 232 156 227 227 220 
R-square
d 
0.4418 0.4603 0.3577 0.4189 0.1208 0.1139 0.1239 
Note: This table summarizes the results of 2SLS regressions testing disposition 
effects on the three potential mechanisms that may link disposition to REIT credit 
rating criteria. EPTRt-1 is the IV for disposition variable in all five models. Definitions 
of the variables are shown in the appendix. Disp*Levt-1 is the interaction term of 
Disp/TAt-1 and Leveraget. The difference in number of observations across the five 
models is due to the missing values in the five dependent variables and the instrument 
variable. I control time fixed effects and property type fixed effects by including year 
dummies and property type dummies. The robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. These errors are clustered by firm and are robust to both heteroskedasticity 
and within-firm correlation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
My results do not support the Efficient Asset Allocation Hypothesis. This 
implies that the overall asset quality does not improve after REITs sell 
properties. This could be for many reasons. For example, the properties sold 
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may not be of low quality, and the remaining properties may not be better in 
performance or management than those disposed of. Another reason could be 
that assets newly acquired after the sale of properties do not perform well in 
the first year of acquisition. 
3.5.3 The mediation effects of the possible mechanisms 
Providing that property disposition affects only one mechanism, property 
focus, I only test the mediation effects of this specific channel. First, as the last 
step suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) to prove a mediation relationship, I 
examine whether the mediator (HHI) affects the dependent variable (Rating) 
using a mixed process model with the IV approach. Second, I identify the 
extent of disposition effects on credit rating through the property focus 
channel. I use the predicted value of HHI (Focus_predicted) to capture 
disposition effects and see how much of the relationship between sale of 
properties and credit rating it can explain. 
Table 3.7 displays the third-step results testing whether HHI affects 
Rating. As shown in the order probit estimation column, HHI has a negative 
coefficient, significant at the 1% level. The economic significance is also 
sizable. For example, a one-unit increase in the geographic focus as measured 
by the HHI will increase the possibility of receiving a BBB- rating rather than 
a lower rating by 6%. This result confirms that change in geographic focus in 
a REIT property portfolio can affect credit ratings.  
Table 3.7 Test the mediation effect of the "focus" mechanism 
 
Ordered 
probit OLS OLS 
 























  Leveraget 0.0190*** 
   (0.0057) 

































year Y Y Y 
property type Y Y Y 









 Note: This table shows the SEM estimation results that property disposition affects 
credit rating through the Focus mechanism (step three). The dependent variables are 
Rating, HHI, and Disp/TAt-1. Definitions of the variables are shown in the appendix. I 
control time fixed effects and property type fixed effects by including year dummies 
and property type dummies. Arc-hyperbolic tangent correlations between the error 
terms of the two equations in the SEM are reported below the main results. The 
robust standard errors are shown in brackets. These errors are clustered by firm and 
are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results from the fourth-step test are reported in Table 3.8. Consistent 
with the hypothesis, the predicted focus variable (Focus_predicted) in model 2 
has a significantly negative coefficient in the ordered probit model. This 
demonstrates that property dispositions positively affect REIT credit ratings by 
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reducing the geographic diversification of the property portfolio. Also, taking 
a BBB- rating as an example, for a one-unit increase in the predicted 
geographic focus level, the possibility of getting a BBB- rating rather than a 
lower rating will increase by 4.9%.  
Table 3.8 Identify the mediation effect of the "focus" mechanism using 
predicted value 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Ordered probit 2SLS 
  Ratingt HHIt 









 Ln(TA)t -0.9019*** -0.0802 
 
(0.0895) (0.0503) 
Leveraget 0.0436*** -0.0005 
 
(0.0070) (0.0029) 































year Y Y 
property type Y Y 
Observations 371 156 
Pseudo R-squared 0.277 
 
Note: This table shows the results using predicted value that extract the mediation 
effect of the focus mechanism (step four). The dependent variables are Rating and HHI. 
Focus_predictedt is the out-of-sample prediction from the fitted model 2. The result 
of model 2 is the second-stage result of the 2SLS model using EPTRt-1 as the 
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instrument variable for Disp/TAt-1. The first-stage result of model 2 is omitted in this 
table. Definitions of the other variables are shown in the appendix. I control time 
fixed effects and property type fixed effects by including year dummies and property 
type dummies. The robust standard errors are shown in brackets. These errors are 
clustered by firm and are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. 
I further correct the standard errors in model 1 through bootstrap estimation. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The finding that geographic focus increases creditors’ wealth is consistent 
with the literature on the “diversification discount” in conventional firms (see, 
e.g., Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger and Ofek 1995) and studies on REIT focus 
(e.g., Capozza and Seguin 1999, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 2003). 
Though theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both 
value-increasing and value-reducing effects, empirical results in these studies 
have shown that diversification reduces firm value. John and Ofek (1995) 
specifically investigate the relationships among asset sales, focus in business 
segments, and firm value. The authors find an increase in focus and 
performance in the year of divestiture and that the improvement in 
performance is positively related to the increase in focus. The literature on 
REITs also shows evidence that focus increases firm value. Capozza and 
Seguin (1999) find that diversification across property types decreases firm 
value and increases the cost of debt and equity. Campbell, Petrova and 
Sirmans (2003) examine the shareholder wealth change before and after REITs’ 
property acquisitions. They distinguish the acquisitions into non-diversifying 
transactions and diversifying transactions. They find significant positive 
abnormal returns partially resulting from a premium received by firms that 
reconfirm their geographic focus in the acquisition.  
Why does focus affect REIT credit rating? Some hints may be gotten from 
the explanations of why diversification adversely affects firm value because 
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credit rating is directly related to firm value. The empirical results from 
Capozza and Seguin (1999) show that more diversified REITs suffer from 
higher corporate-level expenses and are less liquid. Specifically, the higher 
gross yields are offset by higher interest costs and administrative expenses for 
less focused trusts. Also, less focused firms are less transparent, which leads to 
higher informational asymmetries and agency costs. In addition, higher 
property management costs may occur in highly diversified REITs because of 
inefficient management in unfamiliar markets. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade 
(2004) find that out-of-state buyers pay a significantly premium for apartments 
than their in-state counterparts. They suggest that out-of-state buyers have 
higher search costs, a shorter time horizon, and biased beliefs about the pricing 
distribution. Similar situations may occur when REITs invest in unfamiliar 
markets. REITs with geographically diversified properties are more likely to 
own properties in unfamiliar areas or foreign markets. For REITs that do not 
have experts in unfamiliar markets, investing in these markets may be more 
costly and riskier. Therefore, when these REITs sell their inefficiently 
managed properties located in unfamiliar markets, credit rating agencies may 
see it as a promising signal of their future property management. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates the effects of property dispositions on REIT credit 
ratings. I find that property dispositions have a positive effect on REIT 
corporate credit ratings, controlling for the potential endogeneity problem 
associated with firm’s decision to divest assets using the effective property tax 
rate as an instrument variable. I further examine three possible underlying 
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channels for this positive effect on credit ratings: proceeds utilization, efficient 
asset allocation, and property focus. The results show that the positive 
disposition effect on credit ratings is mainly due to the increase in geographic 
focus of REIT property portfolios after dispositions. This evidence supports 
the literature on the “diversification discount.” 
My results are consistent with the general finance literature studying the 
effects of asset disposition on stakeholders’ wealth. Datta and Iskandar-Datta 
(1996) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2003) find that corporate asset 
divestitures are beneficial to bondholders, as shown by event study results. 
The results provide further evidence of positive long-term effects of 
dispositions (with special attention to real estate assets) on debt holders’ 
wealth, using credit rating as an indicator. They imply that REIT managers are 
not likely to make property disposition decisions at the expense of debt 
holders’ benefits.  
The existing literature has found that asset divestiture can improve 
shareholders’ value. I show that property dispositions in REITs are 
value-increasing for creditors as well. As for the reason for the improvement 
in creditors’ value after dispositions, I only find support for the focus 
mechanism. The other two channels (i.e., efficient asset allocation and 
proceeds utilization) cannot explain the positive effects of disposition on credit 
ratings. This differs from the results in the literature on equity value change. 
Studies that examine property dispositions from the perspective of 
shareholders find that efficiencies in asset allocation are the major cause (e.g., 
Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 2006). This difference in findings could be 
due to the difference in the valuation of equity and credit rating. Firm 
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performance is directly related to equity value and equity price reacts quickly 
to change in asset quality as it represents the point-in-time value of the firm. 
However, credit rating captures a firm’s creditworthiness and its likelihood of 
default. Credit rating agencies assign ratings based not only on the current 
firm value but also on a firm’s operating strategy and possible future change in 
risk status. Also, credit rating is much more stable than equity. Only a 
significant and permanent change in a firm’s operating and risk status can 
incur a credit rating change. While change in property quality may bring 
instant cash flow, change in overall property focus reflects a firm’s operating 
strategy and will have more profound effects in the future. Therefore, a credit 
rating may incorporate the change in a firm’s credit risk due to its change in 
geographic focus but not react to the temporary improvement in asset quality. 
This study extends the literature on asset transaction by looking at change 
in creditors’ wealth. Using credit rating as a proxy for a firm’s overall credit 
risk and debt holder’s value, I provide new empirical evidence on whether and 
how real estate asset sell-offs affect credit ratings by specifically investigating 
an industry that is very active in property transactions — REITs. The results 
remain robust after I control for the potential endogeneity problem. I find that 
selling properties has positive effects on credit ratings. I show that the increase 
in geographic focus after property disposition is the main explanation for the 
positive relationship. These findings imply that the agency conflict between 
debt holders and management may not be a severe problem in REITs during 
property sales. These results also help us better understand the property 
management decisions made by REITs and firms in other industries. In 
addition, this study helps REIT managers understand the determinants of 
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credit rating and how their investment strategies could affect credit rating. One 
way to reduce credit risk might be to reduce the geographic diversity of their 
property portfolio. 
 In this study my focus is the effects of selling properties on credit rating. 
Further investigations on how property acquisitions affect debt holders’ 




CHAPTER 4 DO FIRMS BENEFIT FROM “BAD” CREDIT RATINGS? 
4.1 Introduction 
Do firms benefit from unfavorable or “bad” credit ratings? Existing literature 
has shown that credit rating levels matter in stock and bond markets. In 
particular, it is documented that worse ratings cause higher debt finance costs 
and decrease firm value. For instance, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) 
find that announcements of rating downgrades are associated with negative 
abnormal bond and stock returns. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that unexpected 
negative rating changes due to Moody’s rating refinement of its rating system 
can decrease debt value. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) find that firms with a 
higher certification from the fourth credit rating agency (i.e., Dominion Bond 
Rating Service) experience lower debt capital costs. A “strange” phenomenon 
is, given the potential costs of unfavorable corporate credit ratings, most of 
firms still choose to disclose their “bad” ratings even they have a choice to 
keep it confidential.
18
 For firms with unfavorable (i.e., speculative-grade) 
ratings, what are the costs and benefits of disclosing their credit ratings? To 
answer this question, I first examine the stock market reactions around the 
disclosure dates. Moreover, I study firms’ debt financing, capital investments, 
and operating performance before and after their credit rating disclosure.  
My sample consists of 1,913 S&P’s issuer credit rating initiations of U.S. 
                                                        
18 According to S&P’s, firms with less than $1 billion (for the America, Asia and Pacific regions) of 
combined privately rated debt are eligible to solicit Private Credit Rating. The number of third parties 
that can have access to the Private Credit Rating is no more than 75. Public dissemination of a private 
credit rating is not permitted. S&P’s also offers confidential ratings for issuers’ internal use, which 
cannot be disclosed to any third party other than issuers’ professional advisors. According to S&P’s 
CreditPro database, 83% of firms all over the world choose to disclose their ratings to public even 
through their ratings may reflect a high default risk. The identities of firms with private credit ratings are 
kept confidential in the data.   
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pubic firms over the period from 1951 to 2012. Since confidential and private 
credit rating data are not publicly available, standard databases such as S&P’s 
RatingXpress only cover public credit ratings. Thus, my research focus is to 
examine the costs and benefits of disclosing a “bad” public credit rating, rather 
the difference between obtaining a private vs. public rating. I define a “bad” 
credit rating as a speculative-grade credit rating (i.e., lower than BBB- as for 
the long-term issuer credit rating of S&P’s).  
To see whether unfavorable credit ratings incur any cost on firm value, I 
study the stock market reactions associated with the announcements of credit 
rating initiations.
19
 I employ the standard event study methodology to 
examine the abnormal stock returns around the rating initiation date. To 
calculate abnormal return, I use the standard market model as well as the 
Scholes and Williams (1977) market model that accounts for the 
nonsynchronous trading. I find that disclosing an initial speculative-grade 
credit rating is costly around the event period. The average cumulative 
abnormal returns over the (-10, +10) event window is -2.1%, significant at the 
1% level. In contrast, there is no significant stock market reaction for 
investment-grade credit rating initiations. Lastly, I use multivariate 
cross-sectional regression approach to examine the relation between event 
returns and the initial credit rating levels. I find that the lower the initial credit 
rating level, the worse the stock market reactions after controlling for firm 
specific characteristics.   
Given the above negative effects on firm equity value, why do these firms 
still choose to initiate their credit ratings? To see whether these firms benefit 
                                                        
19 Because all the ratings announcements available in the database have been revealed to public, the 
initial rating is considered as the first rating that has been public available. Throughout the study, I use 
the phrases “rating initiation” and “rating disclosure” alternately to address the same issue.  
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from disclosing an unfavorable credit rating, I examine several dimensions of 
firms’ financing and investing activities before and after rating initiation. In 
particular, I test whether firms experience any change in their debt financing, 
asset growth, capital investments, and operating profits.  
I start the analysis by looking at the debt issuance and leverage ratio 
changes around rating initiations. For a given firm, initiating a credit rating 
may improve its financing capability, even though its credit rating does not 
belong to a favorable grade. The intuition is that not only the level of credit 
rating matters in capital markets, but having a rating or not also matters. The 
certification and monitoring from credit rating agencies (CRAs) on rated firms 
are the reasons for the possible improvement in debt financing capacity. 
Sufi (2009) develops a theoretical framework to study the real effects of 
bank loan ratings. He suggests that obtaining a bank loan rating enables firms 
to reduce the certification costs and receive capital from uninformed investors, 
which increase the debt financing ability and in turn affect investment rate. 
Though Sufi (2009)’s analysis is based on the introduction of bank loan ratings, 
it also has an implication on the role played by corporate credit ratings 
assigned by CRAs on firm’s financing capacity, especially for firms with low 
credit quality. Low credit quality firms are considered to be inferior in capital 
market. These firms are associated with higher certification costs and should 
benefit more from third-party debt certification. 
To analyze the debt issuance and leverage ratio changes around rating 
initiations, I include in the sample only firms that initiated credit ratings, and 
examine the difference before and after they disclose their initial credit ratings. 
In this way, each firm serves as its own control. In addition, I control firm 
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fixed effects in the multivariate panel regressions. As a result, the firm specific 
time invariant variables are controlled to the maximum extent. This approach 
has the advantage of avoiding bias due to the potential omission of stable firm 
characteristics that might affect both firms’ debt financing and credit rating 
initiation decisions. Lastly, to control for the time variant elements that may 
impact firm’s debt financing decision, I include a set of control variables in my 
regressions that are proved to affect firm financing choice in the related 
literature. 
I find that after disclosing a speculative-grade rating, firms experience 
significant increases in leverage ratios and debt issuance. After controlling for 
firm characteristics and fixed effects, firms experience 9.9% increase in book 
leverage and 7.7% increase in market leverage after disclosing 
speculative-grade ratings. Moreover, these firms issue 7.0% more net debt 
issuance as measured by debt issuance minus debt reduction in the two years 
since the initiations. This evidence suggests that firms experience an 
improvement in debt financing capability after initiating unfavorable ratings. 
In contrast, I do not find significant evidence of similar magnitude for 
investment-grade initiations. After investment-grade initiations, firms 
experience only 2.4% increase in book leverage and 2.4% increase in net debt 
issuance. No significant increase in market leverage can be found. 
Lastly, I examine firms’ change in asset growth, capital investments, 
operating profits, and profitability before and after rating initiations. I use 
similar methodology as in my analysis on debt financing. I find that firms 
experience a 22 percentage-point increase in their asset growth rate, a 0.6% 
increase in CapEx over total assets in the two years since the initiations of 
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speculative-grade ratings. With respect to profits, I find that these firms 
experience approximately 9% increase in earnings (measured by ln(EBITDA)) 
after rating disclosure, while the profitability ratio (EBIDTA/total assets) 
remains unchanged as compared to the pre-rating period. Again, I do not find 
evidence with similar magnitude for firms initiating investment-grade ratings.  
Overall, my empirical evidence suggests that initiating a “bad” credit 
rating incurs an immediate cost on firms’ stock returns, but it helps firms in 
raising more capital with debt financing and benefits firms in terms of a faster 
asset growth, higher capital investments, and greater operating profits. While 
there is a sharp contrast between costs and benefits for firms initiating 
unfavorable ratings, I do not find a significant cost-benefit tradeoff for firms 
with initial investment-grade ratings.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. First, it 
contributes to the line of research on the economic role of issuer credit rating. 
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) theoretically suggest that credit ratings 
can coordinate investor’s beliefs and monitor firm’s credit quality through the 
watchlist procedure. Bannier and Hirsch (2010) empirically find that credit 
rating watchlist induces firms with low credit quality to reduce their credit risk. 
While these studies focus on credit rating watchlist, my study examines the 
costs and benefits of issuer credit rating initiations. In particular, I provide new 
evidence on the real effects of unfavorable issuer credit rating initiations.  
Second, my study contributes to the literature on the information content 
of credit ratings. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) find that 
announcements of rating downgrades are followed by negative bond and stock 
market reactions. Kliger and Sarig (2000) document that unexpected negative 
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rating changes due to Moody’s rating refinement of its rating system increase 
bond yields and decrease debt value. Different from these studies on credit 
rating level changes (downgrades and upgrades), my study on the other hand 
directly examines the stock market reactions of credit rating initiations. I 
provide novel evidence that the lower the initial credit rating level, the worse 
the stock market reactions.   
Lastly, my study provides new insights on firms’ decision of initiating a 
speculative-grade corporate credit rating. There are both significant costs and 
benefits associated with this decision. On the one hand, these firms experience 
significantly negative stock market reactions around the rating initiation date. 
On the other hand, they benefit from rating initiations through raising more 
capital through debt financing, faster asset growth, higher capital investments, 
and greater operating profits. My evidence helps to understand why many 
firms choose to disclose credit ratings even though their ratings are 
unfavorable.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the data source and summarizes the sample statistics. Section 3 uses event 
study approach to examine the stock market reactions of disclosing initial 
credit ratings. Section 4 looks at the real effects on debt financing associated 
with credit rating initiations. Section 5 studies the real effects on investments 
and operating performance of credit rating initiations. Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review 
For the relationship between credit rating change and stock and debt value, 
existing literature has provided evidence on that worse ratings cause higher 
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debt finance costs and decrease firm value. For example, Hand, Holthausen, 
and Leftwich (1992) find that announcements of rating downgrades are 
associated with negative abnormal bond and stock returns. Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) find that unexpected negative rating changes due to Moody’s rating 
refinement of its rating system can decrease debt value. Kisgen and Strahan 
(2010) find that firms with a higher certification from the fourth credit rating 
agency (i.e., Dominion Bond Rating Service) experience lower debt capital 
costs. These studies show that unfavorable ratings could result in a cost on 
firms’ debt and stock value as compared with better ratings. In other words, 
credit rating level matters when considering the short-term stock and bond 
market returns. 
 On the other hand, another stream of research focuses on the economic 
role of issuer credit rating. Some studies examine the real effects of credit 
rating through the function of watchlist. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) 
theoretically suggest that credit ratings can coordinate investor’s beliefs and 
monitor firm’s credit quality through the watchlist procedure. Bannier and 
Hirsch (2010) empirically find that credit rating watchlist induces firms with 
low credit quality to reduce their credit risk. 
Sufi (2009) investigates the change of firm’s financial condition before 
and after getting a bank loan rating. He suggests that obtaining a bank loan 
rating enables firms to reduce the certification costs and receive capital from 
uninformed investors, which increase the debt financing ability and in turn 
affect investment rate. Though Sufi (2009)’s analysis is based on the 
introduction of bank loan ratings, it also has an implication on the role played 
by corporate credit ratings assigned by CRAs on firm’s financing capacity, 
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especially for firms with low credit quality. Low credit quality firms are 
considered to be inferior in capital market. These firms are associated with 
higher certification costs and should benefit more from third-party debt 
certification. His empirical results support the view that not only rating level 
matters but having a rating or not matters.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I obtain S&P’s corporate long term credit rating data from the S&P’s 
RatingXpress database. The database includes detailed information on firm’s 
historical credit rating and credit rating announcement date from 1923 to 2012. 
The earliest available credit rating announcement of each firm composes the 
credit rating initiation events of my sample. Stock price and share information 
of issuers are gathered from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I 
further refine the credit rating initiation sample by dropping: (1) non-US-firm 
observations; (2) those of which stock information is not available in CRSP; (3) 
unsolicited ratings. My final sample consists of 1913 credit rating initiation 
events from 1951 to 2012. The number of observations decreases in 
multivariate regressions when I add in firm-specific variables that have some 
missing values. Firm-level financial data on total assets, leverage, debt 
issuance, capital investments, and operating profits are obtained from 
Compustat database. In this study I use US public firms to construct my 
sample rather than solely REITs because if I refine the sample to include only 
REITs the firm number will be only 9, which is not adequate for statistical 
analysis. 
Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics of my credit rating initiation 
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sample. Panel A shows the distribution of credit rating initiation events over 
time. The number of initiations increases over time and reaches its peak in 
1990s. The events from 1991 to 2000 constitute about half of the whole 
sample. In my empirical analysis, I convert letter credit ratings into numerical 
rating scores, where a larger number represents a lower/better credit rating 
level. For example, 1 is equivalent to AAA, 10 is equivalent to BBB-, and 18 
is equivalent to CCC. I define “bad” ratings as speculative-grade credit ratings, 
which range from BB+ to CCC in my sample; while “good” ratings are 
investment-grade credit ratings ranging from AAA to BBB-. The distribution 
of the initial credit rating scores is reported in Panel B of Table 4.1. About 16% 
of the initial ratings fall into B-. 54% of the rating initiation sample has 
speculative-grade credit ratings. Panel C of Table 4.1 summarizes firms’ 
characteristics at the first year they disclose their credit ratings. The average 
market capitalization and total assets are $2,200 and $3,632 million 
respectively, while the median values are both under $1,000 million. The mean 
value of book leverage is 34.4%.  
Table 4. 1 Credit rating initiation summary statistics 
 






1951-1960 33 1.7% 
1961-1970 84 4.4% 
1971-1980 135 7.1% 
1981-1990 276 14.4% 
1991-2000 968 50.6% 
2001-2012 417 21.8% 
Total 1913 100.0% 
 
Panel B. Credit Rating Initiations by Rating Category 
 
Rating S&P's Freq. Percent 
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Score Rating 
    1 AAA 34 1.78 
2 AA+ 13 0.68 
3 AA 71 3.71 
4 AA- 24 1.25 
5 A+ 61 3.19 
6 A 169 8.83 
7 A- 88 4.6 
8 BBB+ 104 5.44 
9 BBB 165 8.63 
10 BBB- 146 7.63 
11 BB+ 92 4.81 
12 BB 154 8.05 
13 BB- 237 12.39 
14 B+ 305 15.94 
15 B 170 8.89 
16 B- 68 3.55 
17 CCC+ 11 0.58 
18 CCC 1 0.05 
Total   1,913 100 
 
Panel C. Summary Statistics at Initiation Year 
 
Variables N Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
Rating 1913 10.5 11 3.8 1 18 
Speculative grade 1913 0.543 1 0.498 0 1 
Market Cap (million$) 1890 2200.0 603.0 9837.4 3.5 278873.1 
Total Assets (million$) 1862 3632.2 858.5 12269.2 11.9 208504.0 
Profitability 1829 0.118 0.117 0.091 -0.258 0.382 
M/B 1854 1.358 1.034 1.136 0.124 7.152 
Book Leverage 1850 0.344 0.322 0.216 0.000 1.135 
Tangible 1837 0.318 0.271 0.260 0.000 0.966 
Asset Growth 1851 0.657 0.243 1.130 -0.410 5.898 
CapEx/AT 1710 0.082 0.055 0.088 0.000 0.448 
 
Notes: this table displays the summary statistics of the credit rating initiation 
sample. Panel A shows the distribution of 1,913 credit rating initiation events 
obtained from S&P’s over the period from 1951 to 2012. Pang el B shows the number 
of rating initiations across different rating categories. Panel C presents the summary 
statistics of firm characteristics at the year of rating initiation. Rating is the 
corresponding credit rating score of the first available issuer credit rating assigned by 
S&P’s. Speculative grade is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the credit rating 
level is BB+ or below. Market Cap refers to the total market capitalization. Total 
Assets is the balance sheet total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by 
total assets. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by market assets divided 
by book total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total book assets. 
Tangible is the total net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Asset 
Growth is calculated as total asset change from year t to year t+1 divided by the total 
assets in year t. CapEx/AT is total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
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4.4 Does It Hurt To Disclose A “Bad” Rating? 
In this section, I examine whether there is any cost associated with initiating or 
disclosing an unfavorable rating. I focus on the impact of releasing a credit 
rating on the stock market return. I employ the standard event study 
methodology that tests the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the 
announcement dates of credit rating initiations. If there is a negative abnormal 
return associated with a rating initiation announcement, it indicates that 
disclosing this rating information is costly for a firm’ equity holders. In the 
existing literature, the event study approach has been widely used in analyzing 
the information content of rating change announcements (see, for example, 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Xia, 
2014). However, little attention has been paid to the credit rating initiation 
events. To fill in this gap, I study the stock market reactions around the initial 
credit rating announcements to analyze the short-term effects of rating 
disclosure on firm equity value.  
The daily abnormal return is computed as the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return of the firm. To calculate firm expected 
return, I use both the conventional market model and the Scholes and Williams 
(1977) version of market model to control for the nonsynchronous trading. 
The return of market portfolio is the value-weighted return of all stocks in 
CRSP. The estimation window is a 255-trading-day period, ending 46 trading 
days before the event day. I require the minimum estimation length to be 30 
trading days.  
Table 4.2 presents the results of univariate tests on all credit rating 
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initiation events (Panel A), speculative-grade subsample (Panel B), and 
investment-grade subsample (Panel C), respectively. The third and fourth 
columns display the results estimated using the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
market model. The fifth and sixth columns summarize the results of the 
conventional market model. For each sample group, results from four 
specifications of event windows are demonstrated: (-1, 1) (-3, 3) (-5, 5) (-10, 
10). Of all the four event windows, rating initiations with speculative-grade 
ratings, i.e. “bad” ratings, are associated with significant negative CARs. For 
example, as shown in the results from Scholes-Williams market model, the 
CAR for three-day event window (-1, 1) is -0.36%, significant at the 10% 
level. As the event window expands to (-10, 10), the CAR reaches -2.07%, 
with a statistical significance of the 1% level. These evidences reveal that 
disclosing an initial speculative rating has a significant and negative impact on 
stock market around the event period. Therefore, disclosing “bad” ratings to 
public is not costless; it results in an immediate decrease on firm value. This 
negative market reaction may be because investors interpret a 
speculative-grade credit rating as a negative signal on firm’s credibility and 
the ability of raising capital, which affects profitability.  
To certify that this negative market reaction is because of 
speculative-grade credit rating initiation rather than rating initiation event 
itself, I also report CARs over the investment-grade credit rating initiation 
event window. As shown in Panel C, results of investment-grade subsample 
tend to have positive CARs but are not statistically different from zero. Panel 
D presents the t test results testing the difference between the CARs of 
speculative-grade and investment-grade subsamples. The differences are 
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significant at 1% level for event window (-3, 3) (-5, 5) (-10, 10). For example, 
the CARs for speculative-grade subsample estimated using Scholes and 
Williams (1977) market model is 2.28% lower than the CARs for 
investment-grade sample. Obviously, the negative CARs are because of 
speculative-grade subsample rather than rating initiation itself.  
Table 4. 2 Mean cumulative stock market reaction to credit rating 
initiation 
 
    Scholes-Williams 
Market Model 
Market Model 
Window N CAR t CAR t 
 
Panel A: All Credit Rating Initiations 
  
(-1,+1) 1913 -0.25% -1.388 -0.27% -1.566 
(-3,+3) 1913 -0.46% -1.747* -0.47% -1.835* 
(-5,+5) 1913 -0.68% -1.750* -0.69% -1.834* 
(-10,+10) 1913 -1.02% -1.965** -1.02% -1.974** 
 
Panel B: Speculative-grade 
   
(-1,+1) 1038 -0.36% -1.789* -0.39% -1.913* 
(-3,+3) 1038 -0.90% -2.919*** -0.91% -2.968*** 
(-5,+5) 1038 -1.26% -2.640*** -1.25% -2.602*** 
(-10,+10) 1038 -2.07% -3.337*** -2.06% -3.361*** 
 
Panel C: Investment-grade 
   
(-1,+1) 875 -0.11% -0.103 -0.13% -0.231 
(-3,+3) 875 0.06% 0.598 0.05% 0.521 
(-5,+5) 875 0.02% 0.289 -0.02% 0.124 
(-10,+10) 875 0.21% 0.728 0.21% 0.742 
      
Panel D: Difference Between Speculative-grade and Investment-grade 
(-1,+1)  -0.26% -1.14 -0.26% -1.17 
(-3,+3)  -0.96%  -2.86*** -0.96% -2.83*** 
(-5,+5)  -1.28% -3.06*** -1.23% -2.94*** 
(-10,+10)  -2.28% -4.07*** -2.26% -4.04*** 
 
Notes: this table provides the results of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
the S&P’s initial credit rating announcements for 1,913 US public firms from 1951 to 
2012. The results using speculative-grade subsample and investment-grade subsample 
are shown in Panel B and C respectively. Panel D presents the results testing the 
difference between the CARs of speculative-grade and investment-grade subsamples. 
The third and fourth columns display the results estimated by market model using 
Scholes and Williams’ beta. The fifth and sixth columns summarize the results of 
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standard market model. For each sample group, results from four specifications of 
event windows are demonstrated: (-1, 1) (-3, 3) (-5, 5) (-10, 10). 
 
Next, I employ multivariate regression to directly test the relation between 
initial rating level and market reaction on initial rating disclosure. I use the 
following models:  
 
                                     ,      (1) 
                             ,        (2) 
 
where Speculative grade is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
initial rating is lower than BBB-, and zero otherwise. Rating is a discrete 
variable with value ranging from 1 to 18, corresponding to the initial rating 
score. A higher value of Rating represents a lower/better credit rating level. 
The matrix Xi includes firm size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, book 
leverage ratio, year dummies, and industry dummies. The dependent variable 
is the CAR estimated from event window (-10, 10).
20
  
The results are presented in Table 4.3. The first two columns show the 
estimation results using Speculative grade as the key variable. In line with the 
implication from the univariate tests, the coefficients of Speculative grade are 
significantly negative at 1% level. In terms of magnitude, firms with 
speculative-grade initial credit ratings on average experiences approximately 2% 
less abnormal stock return than do firms with investment-grade initial ratings. 
For firms disclosing their speculative-grade credit rating, there is a “real cost” 
on equity value. Column (3) and (4) of Table 4.3 present the results using 
Rating as the key variable to test whether credit rating level affect stock 
                                                        
20 I get similar results if I use CARs estimated from other event windows as the dependent variable.  
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market reaction on rating initiation. The significantly negative coefficients of 
Rating confirm that “bad” initial rating leads to worse stock market reaction 
than “good” initial ratings around the rating initiation event period.  
Table 4. 3 The effects of rating level on the stock market reaction to rating 
initiations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-10,+10) 
     
Speculative 
grade 
-0.0224*** -0.0162**   
 (0.0061) (0.0076)   
Rating   -0.0036*** -0.0029** 
   (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Size  0.0010  -0.0003 
  (0.0025)  (0.0028) 
Profitability  0.0665**  0.0577* 
  (0.0320)  (0.0330) 
M/B  -0.0048**  -0.0049** 
  (0.0020)  (0.0020) 
Book leverage  0.0066  0.0098 
  (0.0169)  (0.0174) 
     
Constant -0.0344 0.0846* -0.0060 0.1221** 
 (0.0263) (0.0447) (0.0256) (0.0516) 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y 
Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,913 1,796 1,913 1,796 
R-squared 0.0331 0.0457 0.0352 0.0463 
 
Notes: this table presents the multivariate regression results testing the effect of 
initial credit rating level on the stock market reaction to initial rating disclosures. The 
sample consists of 1,913 S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms in the period 
from 1951 to 2012. After adding in firm-specific control variables, the number of 
observations reduces to 1,796. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return estimated by Scholes and Williams’ market model over the event window (-10, 
+10) around the date of initial credit rating announcements. Rating is the 
corresponding credit rating score of the first available issuer credit rating assigned by 
S&P’s. Speculative grade is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the credit rating 
level is BB+ or below. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is 
defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is 
calculated by market assets divided by book total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to the total book assets. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled in all 
the model specifications. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 




Both the univariate tests and multivariate regressions confirm that 
initiating or disclosing unfavourable ratings, i.e. speculative-grade ratings, is 
costly in terms of a negative cumulative abnormal return around the event 
period. Given this cost, why do most of firms still choose to disclose their 
speculative-grade ratings? Despite the negative effect on stock returns, 
initiation with “bad” ratings may still benefit firms in other aspects. Could it 
be that even a speculative-grade rating helps a firm to increase its access to 
capital market and thus raise capital to take advantage of its investment 
opportunities? I explore these questions in the next two sections. 
4.5 Do “Bad” Ratings Help To Increase Debt Financing? 
In the last section, I find that initiating a speculative-grade credit rating is a 
negative signal to the stock market, while the initiation of an investment-grade 
rating do not have significant effects on stock return. The next interesting 
question is, for the firms choosing to disclose their “bad” ratings and bear the 
cost, what do they benefit from this decision? To study this question, I first 
examine firms’ debt financing behavior before and after credit rating 
initiations.  
The importance of credit ratings in public debt markets has been 
addressed in many studies. Credit ratings are directly related to financing 
capability and considered to be one of the most important determinants of 
firms’ capital structure. The difference between speculative-grade and 
investment-grade ratings in determining the debt financing ability is 
significant. This is because there are regulations with specific effects on the 
cost of capital for firms with speculative-grade credit ratings. For example, 
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Grinblatt and Titman (2002) point out that many bond portfolio managers are 
restricted from owning speculative-grade bonds. Kisgen (2006) mentions that 
banks have been restricted from owning speculative-grade bonds since 1936, 
and loans and savings were prohibited from holding any speculative-grade 
bonds by 1994. These regulations imply the negative effect of 
speculative-grade credit rating on firm’s access to debt capital. Indeed, holding 
other elements constant, a firm with investment-grade rating is more 
competitive than a firm with speculative-grade rating in bond market and thus 
is able to raise more debt financing. However, for the same firm, initiating a 
credit rating may improve its financing capability, even its credit rating does 
not belong to a favorable grade. The intuition is, not only the level of credit 
rating matters in capital market, but also having a rating or not matters. 
Evidence from related literature has indicated a positive relation between 
the rating initiation and firm leverage ratio. Using debt rating as a proxy for 
having access to the public debt market, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find 
that firms with debt ratings have leverage ratios that are over 50% higher than 
firms that do not have ratings. Sufi (2009) focuses on the introduction of bank 
loan rating and examines whether it affect the supply of debt financing. His 
empirical results reveal that firms that obtain a loan rating experience an 
increase in their leverage ratio.  
To analyze the debt issuance and leverage ratio changes around rating 
initiations, I include in the sample only firms which eventually initiated credit 
ratings, and examine the difference before and after they disclose their initial 
credit ratings. In this way, each firm serves as its own control. In addition, I 
control firm fixed effects in the multivariate panel regressions. As a result, the 
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firm specific time invariant variables are controlled to the maximum extent. 
This approach has the advantage of avoiding bias due to the potential omission 
of stable firm characteristics that might affect both firms’ debt financing and 
credit rating initiation decisions. Lastly, to control the time variant elements 
that may impact firm’s capital structure decisions, I include a set of control 
variables that are shown to affect firm financing choice by the existing 
literature (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Faulkender and Peterson, 2006; Sufi, 2009). These variables include 
market-to-book ratio, firm size, profitability, and tangible assets as percentage 
of total assets.  
I use several variables to access firm’s debt financing behavior. The most 
intuitive measure is leverage ratio. As firms have more access to debt capital, 
it is less costly for them to issue debt. As a result, their debt levels relative to 
firm size are likely to increase. In particular, I examine both the book and 
market leverage ratios. Book Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt 
and short-term debt divided by total book assets. Following Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), I calculate Market Leverage by dividing total book debt by 
the result of total assets minus book equity plus market equity. One concern of 
using leverage ratio to reflect firm’s debt financing choice is that the balance 
sheet level information can include noncash changes (Kisgen, 2006). To 
address this issue, I use cash flow based variables to directly measure the debt 
issuance activity. Debt Issuance is the long-term debt issuance (Compustat 
data item 111) as percentage of total assets. Net DebtIss is defined as 
long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat data item 
111 minus item 114) as percentage of total assets.  
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Table 4.4 summarizes the mean value of book leverage, market leverage, 
debt issuance, and net debt issuance each year in three years before and after 
the rating initiation year. A clear trend can be seen from the statistics: in the 
year that firms disclose their initial credit ratings, both leverage ratio and debt 
issuance activity increase sharply compared to the earlier years. Panel B 
presents the difference between speculative-grade subsample and 
investment-grade subsample. As can be seen, this effect is significantly larger 
for the speculative-grade subsample than for the investment-grade subsample. 
For instance, in the initial year of disclosing their speculative-grade rating (i.e., 
year=0), firms tend to experience approximately 38% ([43.2%-31.4%]/31.4%) 
increase in book leverage ratio. For firms with initial investment-grade ratings, 
this number change to 15%. The differences between the two groups in year 0 
and year 1 are significant at 1% level. For market leverage, speculative-grade 
subsample grows from 28% to 39.5% with an increase rate of 41%, while 
investment-grade subsample grows from 26.5% to 29.4% with an increase rate 
of 11% from year -1 to 0. The gap in leverage ratio between the firms with 
speculative-grade initial rating and firms with investment-grade initial rating 
increases sharply from year -1 to year 1. Since the second year after rating 
initiation, the gap in leverage ratio starts to decrease. This indicates that firms 
that initiate with speculative-grade credit ratings engage in more aggressive 
debt financing than those with investment-grade ratings immediately after 
rating initiations. Furthermore, the speculative-grade subsample has larger 
increase in debt issuance and net debt issuance from year -1 to year 0 than 
investment-grade subsample. The gap between the two groups in debt issuance 
grows from 12.9% to 25.4%. The gap in net debt issuance grows from 3.8% to 
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12.7%. If holding the demand side of debt financing markets constant, the 
difference in leverage increase rate between the two subsamples implies that 
after disclosing a speculative-grade rating, a firm’s debt financing capacity 
increase more than initiating an investment-grade rating. In the first year after 
firm initiating rating, leverage ratio still experience a small increase for both 
speculative-grade and investment-grade ratings. After that, leverage ratios 
stabilize over time. Debt issuance activity in year 1 becomes less than the year 
with rating initiation, but still has a value larger than any year before rating 
disclosure. The results show the most active period of debt financing is the 
year of rating initiation and the following year. 
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Table 4. 4 Leverage ratio and debt issuance around the year of credit rating initiation 
Panel A. Leverage ratio and debt issuance for all initiations, speculative-grade subsample, and investment grade subsample 
  
All Initiations  
(N=1868)   
Speculative Grade  
(N=1018)   



























year=-3 25.7% 27.4% 11.8% 2.4% 
 
30.0% 27.3% 15.4% 3.0% 
 
20.9% 27.5% 6.5% 1.5% 
year=-2 26.0% 26.6% 12.2% 2.9% 
 
30.9% 26.8% 16.6% 3.9% 
 
20.2% 26.4% 5.5% 1.3% 
year=-1 26.8% 27.3% 13.7% 4.0% 
 
31.4% 28.0% 18.7% 5.5% 
 
21.2% 26.5% 5.8% 1.6% 
year=0 34.4% 34.7% 26.4% 12.8% 
 
43.2% 39.5% 36.7% 17.9% 
 
24.3% 29.4% 11.3% 5.2% 
year=1 36.8% 37.9% 14.7% 5.2% 
 
47.3% 44.7% 19.3% 7.0% 
 
25.3% 30.7% 8.5% 2.8% 
year=2 36.0% 38.4% 11.3% 1.9% 
 
45.9% 44.9% 14.6% 2.0% 
 
25.6% 31.9% 7.1% 1.7% 
year=3 35.1% 38.2% 11.6% 1.4%   44.9% 44.4% 15.8% 1.8%   25.4% 32.6% 6.5% 0.8% 
Panel B. Difference between speculative grade and investment grade 














year=-3 9.1% 9.11*** -0.2% -1.32 8.9% 6.51*** 1.5% 2.32*** 
year=-2 10.7% 11.15*** 0.5% 1.01 11.2% 9.28*** 2.6% 4.35*** 
year=-1 10.2% 11.76*** 1.5% 1.13 12.9% 13.47*** 3.8% 6.36*** 
year=0 18.9% 21.02*** 10.1% 8.49*** 25.4% 22.18*** 12.7% 15.58*** 
year=1 21.9% 22.83*** 14.0% 10.36*** 10.8% 9.23*** 4.3% 6.22*** 
year=2 20.4% 19.45*** 12.9% 8.32*** 7.4% 7.48*** 0.3% 0.07 
year=3 19.5% 17.32*** 11.8% 7.18*** 9.3% 7.47*** 1.0% 1.83* 
103 
 
Notes: this table presents the mean value of leverage ratio and debt issuance before and after the initial rating year. Year=0 is the year in which 
firm disclose the initial credit rating. Book Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total book assets. Market Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
the total market assets. Debt Issuance is the long-term debt issuance divided by total assets. Net Debt Issuance is defined as long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt reduction as percentage of total assets. 
 
Table 4. 5 Credit rating initiation and leverage ratio 
 
  All Initiations   Speculative Grade   Investment Grade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 


























     
 
    
 
    
Post_initiation 0.096*** 0.053*** 0.100*** 0.037*** 
 
0.143*** 0.099*** 0.157*** 0.077*** 
 
0.045*** 0.024*** 0.047*** 0.009 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
M/B  -0.012***  -0.060*** 
 
 -0.011**  -0.060*** 
 
 -0.004  -0.044*** 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
 
 (0.005)  (0.004) 
 
 (0.004)  (0.006) 
Size  0.044***  0.058*** 
 
 0.035***  0.050*** 
 
 0.029**  0.043*** 
 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
 
 (0.008)  (0.007) 
 
 (0.011)  (0.012) 
Profitability  -0.388***  -0.403*** 
 
 -0.385***  -0.377*** 
 
 -0.455***  -0.600*** 
 
 (0.060)  (0.046) 
 
 (0.068)  (0.050) 
 
 (0.053)  (0.077) 
Tangible  0.178***  0.193*** 
 
 0.223***  0.247*** 
 
 0.019  0.016 
 
 (0.039)  (0.033) 
 
 (0.050)  (0.041) 
 
 (0.044)  (0.046) 
Constant 0.261*** -0.018 0.271*** -0.019 
 
0.309*** 0.083* 0.275*** 0.064 
 
0.207*** 0.069 0.266*** 0.099 
 
(0.002) (0.042) (0.002) (0.039) 
 
(0.004) (0.045) (0.004) (0.040) 
 
(0.002) (0.085) (0.002) (0.090) 
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Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 12,288 11,238 11,500 11,238 
 
6,472 5,774 5,833 5,774 
 
5,816 5,464 5,667 5,464 
R-squared 0.123 0.233 0.131 0.331 
 
0.164 0.275 0.205 0.38 
 
0.092 0.189 0.062 0.245 
No. of firms 1,903 1,880 1,903 1,880  1,035 1,032 1,035 1,032  868 848 868 848 
Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms 
in the period from 1951 to 2012 after dropping the observations with missing values in the control variables. The dependent variable is either 
Book Leverage or Market Leverage. Book Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total book assets. Market Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
the total market assets. Post_initiation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year that the observation occurs is in or after the year that 
firms disclose their first credit rating and 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by market assets divided by book total 
assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangible is the total net property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 depict the change of leverage ratio and debt 
issuances surrounding the rating initial year. It is clear that both book and 
market leverage ratios experience a significant increase. The ratio reaches its 
peak in the first year after rating initiation. The leverage ratio of firms with 
speculative-grade initial rating rises more than firms with investment-grade 
initial rating, which can also be seen from Panel B of Table 4.4. In the year of 
disclosing initial rating, for both speculative-grade and investment-grade 
rating, debt issuance and net debt issuance boost to the peak. Again, this effect 
is stronger for firms with unfavourable initial ratings. 
Figure 4. 1 Leverage Ratios around Credit Rating Initiations 
 
Panel A. Book Leverage 
 
 
Panel B. Market Leverage 

























Figure 4. 2 Debt Issuances around Credit Rating Initiations 
 
 




Panel B. Net Debt Issuances 





















All Speculative Investment 

























Next, I use the multivariate regression approach to examine firms’ debt 
financing behaviour by controlling for time-varying firm characteristics. The 
basic empirical models for panel regressions with respect to debt financing 
change are as below: 
 
                                                     ,   (3) 
                                                   ,    (4) 
 
where Post_initiation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year that the 
observation occurs is in or after the year that firms disclose their first credit 
rating, and 0 otherwise. Event year equals to 1 for all observations in the year 
of or one year after credit rating initiation, and 0 otherwise. The other two 
specifications of the empirical model are to replace Book Leverage in 
Equation (3) by Market Leverage, and Debt Issuance in Equation (4) by Net 
DebtIss. If disclosing credit rating helps a firm to raise debt financing, the 

























All Speculative Investment 
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estimated 1 and 1’ should be positive and significant. If disclosing “bad” 
rating can still help to increase firm’s debt financing capacity, I expect that for 
the speculative-grade subsample, the coefficient of Post_initiation and Event 
year should be consistently positive. To control the time variant elements that 
may impact firms’ capital structure decisions, I include a set of control 
variables that are shown to affect firm financing choice by the existing 
literature (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Faulkender and Peterson, 2006; Sufi, 2009). These variables include 
market-to-book ratio, firm size, profitability ratio, and tangible assets as 
percentage of total assets. I also include firm fixed effects to mitigate the 
omitted variable concerns. 
Table 4.5 presents the panel regression results using leverage ratios as the 
dependent variable. For both speculative-grade and investment-grade 
subsamples, and constantly across all the model specifications, the coefficients 
of Post_initiation are all positive with a statistical significance of 1%. In term 
of economic magnitude, the increase in book leverage ratio after disclosing a 
speculative-grade credit rating is about 10%, and the increase in market 
leverage is about 8%. This strong evidence suggests that a firm’s debt level 
significantly increases even after disclosing a “bad” credit rating to the public. 
In contrast, I do not find significant evidence of similar magnitude for 
investment-grade initiations. After investment-grade initiations, firms 
experience only 2.4% increase in book leverage and 2.4% increase in net debt 
issuance. I do not find any significant increase in market leverage after 
investment-grade initiations. 
The coefficients of control variables have the consistent signs as in 
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previous literature. M/B is significantly negatively related to leverage ratio. 
There are two possible explanations. First, firms with high market-to-book 
ratios are considered to have higher costs of financial distress. Second, when 
stock price is higher than the book value, firms tend to use more equity to 
finance investments and thus lower down debt ratio. Firm size and the 
tangibility of assets are positively related to leverage ratios since larger firm 
and firms with more tangible assets are expected to have lower cost of 
financial distress. Profitability has a negative impact on leverage ratios. The 
reason could be that firms with high profitability may use earnings to pay 
down debt.  
Table 4.6 presents the estimation results of Equation (4) with cash flow 
statement variables, debt issuance and net debt issuance, as the dependent 
variable. Consistent with the results on leverage ratio changes, debt issuance 
and net debt issuance both experience a significant growth in the rating 
initiation year and the year followed. The increase in debt issuance and net 
debt issuance for firms with speculative-grade initial rating is about triple the 
size of increase for firms initiating with investment-grade rating. Specifically, 
the coefficients of Event year for the speculative-grade subsample 9.5% for 
debt issuance and 7.0% for net debt issuance, while for the investment-grade 
subsample, these two numbers are 3.5% and 2.4% respectively. This evidence 
indicates that firms react quickly to the opportunity of debt financing after 
they announce their credit ratings. Even speculative-grade ratings enable firms 
to gain more access to debt capital, which makes firms with speculative-grade 
initial ratings more aggressive in raising debt capital after they disclose their 
ratings. 
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Table 4. 6 Credit rating initiation and debt issuance activity 
  All Initiations   Speculative Grade   Investment Grade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 


























     
 
    
 
    
Event Year 0.083*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.050*** 
 
0.117*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.070*** 
 
0.036*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
M/B  0.009***  0.011*** 
 
 0.011***  0.012*** 
 
 0.008*  0.009*** 
 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Size  0.030***  0.031*** 
 
 0.029***  0.035*** 
 
 0.016*  0.007 
 
 (0.005)  (0.003) 
 
 (0.006)  (0.003) 
 
 (0.008)  (0.004) 
Profitability  -0.183***  -0.178*** 
 
 -0.182***  -0.176*** 
 
 -0.205***  -0.241*** 
 
 (0.043)  (0.037) 
 
 (0.049)  (0.044) 
 
 (0.078)  (0.043) 
Tangible  -0.081*  -0.121*** 
 
 -0.068  -0.150*** 
 
 -0.133**  -0.058** 
 
 (0.044)  (0.028) 
 
 (0.054)  (0.036) 
 
 (0.053)  (0.027) 
Constant 0.122*** -0.038 0.026*** -0.133*** 
 
0.164*** 0.007 0.034*** -0.130*** 
 
0.063*** 0.019 0.014*** 0.010 
 
(0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.024) 
 
(0.002) (0.042) (0.001) (0.026) 
 
(0.001) (0.070) (0.001) (0.040) 
               
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 10,364 9,351 9,991 9,006 
 
6,068 5,388 5,898 5,237 
 
4,296 3,963 4,093 3,769 
R-squared 0.051 0.066 0.061 0.096 
 
0.069 0.081 0.085 0.121 
 
0.028 0.045 0.028 0.051 
No. of firms 1,728 1,697 1,712 1,680   1,022 1,013 1,017 1,008   706 684 695 672 
Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public 
firms in the period from 1951 to 2012 after dropping the observations with missing values in the control variables. The dependent variable is 
either Debt Issuance or Net DebtIss. Debt Issuance is the long-term debt issuance divided by total assets. Net DebtIss is defined as long-term 
debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction as percentage of total assets. Event year is a dummy variable that is equal to 1for all observations 
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in the year of or one year after credit rating initiation, and equals to 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by market 
assets divided by book total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. 
Tangible is the total net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4. 7 Asset growth, investment, and profitability around the year of credit rating initiation 
Panel A. Asset growth, investment, and profitability for all initiations, speculative-grade subsample, and investment grade subsample 


































year=-3 33.9% 7.9% 205.2 2259.4 12.8% 
 
49.1% 8.8% 66.3 621.2 11.4% 
 
18.9% 6.8% 358.2 4040.6 14.4% 
year=-2 38.0% 8.3% 216.9 2434.3 12.8% 
 
56.6% 9.3% 72.3 664.8 11.2% 
 
18.0% 6.9% 388.8 4507.6 14.8% 
year=-1 53.1% 8.3% 237.5 2784.5 12.8% 
 
79.9% 9.1% 82.8 799.2 11.1% 
 
21.7% 7.3% 426.5 5148.4 14.8% 
year=0 65.7% 8.2% 285.2 3632.2 11.8% 
 
98.9% 8.9% 101.0 1182.9 10.0% 
 
27.5% 7.3% 501.6 6442.9 13.8% 
year=1 25.0% 7.7% 337.0 4101.0 11.4% 
 
32.5% 8.4% 126.9 14 71.3 9.7% 
 
16.9% 6.8% 571.4 6984.1 13.3% 
year=2 14.0% 6.8% 376.6 4499.7 11.4% 
 
14.7% 7.3% 145.3 1563.5 9.9% 
 
13.3% 6.2% 625.8 7596.3 13.0% 
year=3 12.1% 6.3% 416.0 5133.0 11.2% 
 
11.4% 6.7% 166.5 1858.0 9.9% 
 
12.8% 5.9% 667.9 8383.6 12.5% 
Panel B. Difference between speculative grade and investment grade 
Difference between Speculative Grade and Investment Grade 
 Asset growth t test CapEx/AT t test EBITDA(m$) t test Total Assets(m$) t test Profit t test 
year=-3 25.8% 7.62*** 2.0% 5.06*** -291.9 -8.26*** -3419.4 -9.69 *** -3.0% -5.77*** 
year=-2 37.1% 9.75*** 2.4% 6.18*** -316.5 -8.93*** -3842.8 -9.09*** -3.6% -7.37 *** 
year=-1 57.0% 12.67*** 1.8% 4.55*** -343.7 -10.14*** -4349.2 -9.25*** -3.7% -8.10*** 
year=0 68.0% 14.87*** 1.6% 4.30*** -400.6 -8.51*** -5260 -8.79*** -3.8% -9.09*** 
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year=1 16.2% 5.98*** 1.6% 4.37*** -444.5 -7.25*** -5512.8 -8.99*** -3.6% -8.34*** 
year=2 1.7% 1.02 1.1% 3.52*** -480.5 -7.45*** -6032.8 -9.10 *** -3.1% -6.52*** 
year=3 -1.2% -0.69 0.8% 2.57*** -501.4 -7.55*** -6525.6 -8.60 *** -2.6% -5.57*** 
Notes: this table presents the mean value of asset growth, capital expenditure, earnings, total assets, and profitability before and after the initial 
rating year. Year=0 is the year in which firm disclose the initial credit rating. Asset Growth is calculated as total asset change from year t to year 
t+1 divided by the total assets in year t. CapEx/AT is capital expenditure divided by total assets. Total Assets is the balance sheet total assets. 
Profit is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. 
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Why do firms with speculative-grade initial rating increase more in 
leverage ratio and debt issuance than firms with investment-grade initial rating? 
This could be due to the difference in ex-ante firm characteristics of these two 
types of firms. Firms initiated with speculative-grade ratings tend to be smaller 
and less profitable than firms with initial investment-grade rating (see Table 
4.7 for a summary of firm size and profitability for these two subsamples 
before rating initiations). On one hand, before initiating a credit rating, these 
smaller and less profitable firms are less competitive than other firms in the 
debt market, probably due to information asymmetry. In other words, the 
supply of debt capital for these firms is limited. On the other hand, these less 
competitive firms are exactly the firms that have higher demand for debt 
financing. Obtaining a credit rating from a rating agency like S&P’s can help 
to improve the supply of debt capital by reducing the information asymmetry. 
When there is an increase in the supply to meet the demand, firms are able to 
reach their desirable leverage ratio and issue more debt to raise capital to take 
advantage of their investment opportunities. Therefore, the empirical results 
show a larger increase in leverage ratio and debt issuance for the 
speculative-grade subsample than the investment-grade subsample. 
4.6 Credit Rating Initiation Effects on Investment and Profitability 
The results from last section show that rating initiation can benefit firms 
through an increase in debt financing and firms with initially “bad” ratings 
tend to benefit more than other initiation firms. Besides the increase in raising 
more debt capital, could rating initiations benefit firms on other dimensions? 
In this section, I examine firm’s asset growth, capital investments, and 
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profitability before and after rating disclosure. 
Panel A of Table 4.7 summarizes the mean value of asset growth, capital 
expenditure, earnings, total assets, and profitability each year in the three years 
before and after credit rating initiation for the whole sample, the 
speculative-grade subsample, and the investment-grade subsample, 
respectively. Panel B presents the difference between speculative-grade and 
investment-grade subsamples. The differences between two subsamples in ex 
ante firm characteristics are notable. In the years before getting a credit rating, 
firms that initiate speculative-grade ratings are significantly smaller, less 
profitable, and with higher asset growth rate. These differences between the 
two groups become less evident after firms disclosing their credit ratings. In 
the earliest year of three years before rating initiation (t=-3), the 
investment-grade subsample is 5.5 times larger than the speculative-grade 
group in terms of total assets. In the rating initiation year (t=0), this ratio drops 
to 4.4. In the third year after rating disclosure (t=3), the total assets of the 
investment-grade group is only 3.5 times larger than the speculative-grade 
group. This is a result of a rapid growth in assets for firms with initial 
speculative-grade rating. In the rating initiation year, their asset growth is 
nearly 100%.  
Both the two groups experience improvement in operating profits as 
measured by EBITDA immediately after they disclose their initial rating. 
However, the increase rate in EBITDA in speculative-grade subsample is 
higher in magnitude and is more persistent than the investment-grade 
subsample. From t=-1 to t=0, the mean EBITDA of the first group rises from 
82.8 to 101.0, with an increase rate of 22%. From t=0 to t=1, the average value 
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of earnings further increase to 126.9, with an increase rate of 26%. These two 
numbers change to 18% and 14% for the investment-grade group. For 
profitability, both the two groups experience a slightly decrease as firm 
disclosing their ratings. This is most likely because that the increase in firm 
size is faster than change in earnings. Similarly patterns are shown in the 
change of capital expenditures. The surge of total assets immediately after 
rating initiation dominates the increase in dollar value capital expenditures.  
Figure 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 illustrate the change asset growth, capital 
expenditure as a percent of assets, and profitability around the initial rating 
year, respectively. It is evident that firms with speculative-grade initial ratings 
experience the highest increase in asset growth. From the second year after 
disclosing rating, firms’ asset growth rate drops to a constant value of 
about14%. Capital expenditure and profitability tend to decrease over time for 
the whole sample. This should be the result of a dramatic increase in the 
denominator (i.e., total assets). 
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Figure 4. 3 Asset Growth around Credit Rating Initiations 
 
 














































All Speculative Investment 
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Table 4. 8 Credit rating initiation and asset growth, investment, and 
profitability 
Panel A All Initiations 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Asset growth  CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability 
       
Event Year 0.136***  0.005***    
 (0.015)  (0.001)    
Post_initiation    0.034** 0.635*** -0.005** 
    (0.014) (0.016) (0.002) 
M/B 0.179***  0.005*** 0.135*** -0.151*** 0.017*** 
 (0.026)  (0.001) (0.012) (0.016) (0.002) 
Book Leverage -0.901***  -0.008 -0.452*** 0.598*** -0.089*** 
 (0.146)  (0.007) (0.073) (0.106) (0.012) 
Profitability -1.333***  0.046***  0.306  
 (0.291)  (0.017)  (0.205)  
Size 0.176***  -0.003** 0.922***  0.004 
 (0.032)  (0.002) (0.019)  (0.003) 
Constant -0.705***  0.087*** -1.760*** 6.437*** 0.102*** 
 (0.227)  (0.011) (0.118) (0.048) (0.017) 
       
Firm FEs Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,831  10,402 10,719 11,346 11,346 
R-squared 0.051  0.019 0.592 0.458 0.113 





















All Speculative Investment 
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Panel B Speculative Grade and Investment Grade 
 Speculative Grade  Investment Grade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Asset growth CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability  Asset growth CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability 
            
Event Year 0.219*** 0.006***     0.053*** 0.004***    
 (0.027) (0.002)     (0.011) (0.001)    
Post_initiation   0.087*** 0.810*** -0.001    0.018 0.485*** -0.001 
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.003)    (0.014) (0.017) (0.002) 
M/B 0.217*** 0.005*** 0.140*** -0.152*** 0.015***  0.050*** 0.004*** 0.133*** -0.076** 0.022*** 
 (0.033) (0.001) (0.016) (0.019) (0.002)  (0.017) (0.001) (0.015) (0.030) (0.002) 
Book Leverage -1.155*** -0.013 -0.435*** 0.436*** -0.087***  0.193 0.015 -0.652*** 0.466** -0.124*** 
 (0.170) (0.009) (0.087) (0.121) (0.014)  (0.132) (0.010) (0.136) (0.206) (0.015) 
Profitability -1.412*** 0.034*  0.477**   -0.593** 0.085***  -0.902***  
 (0.364) (0.020)  (0.242)   (0.253) (0.023)  (0.317)  
Size 0.199*** -0.002 0.921***  0.007**  0.100*** -0.006*** 0.883***  -0.011*** 
 (0.041) (0.002) (0.024)  (0.003)  (0.030) (0.002) (0.026)  (0.004) 
Constant -0.539** 0.089*** -1.839*** 5.729*** 0.076***  -0.614*** 0.091*** -1.371*** 7.315*** 0.226*** 
 (0.265) (0.012) (0.139) (0.060) (0.018)  (0.217) (0.016) (0.181) (0.083) (0.028) 
            
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,058 5,615 5,237 5,806 5,806  4,773 4,787 5,482 5,540 5,540 
R-squared 0.068 0.017 0.586 0.477 0.094  0.028 0.036 0.617 0.486 0.222 
No. of firms 1,035 1,011 988 1,035 1,035  858 769 861 862 862 
Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms 
in the period from 1951 to 2012 after dropping the observations with missing values in the control variables. The dependent variables are the 
measures of asset growth, investment, earning, size, and profitability. Event year is a dummy variable that is equal to 1for all observations in the 
year of or one year after credit rating initiation, and equals to 0 otherwise. Post_initiation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year that 
the observation occurs is in or after the year that firms disclose their first credit rating and 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is 
calculated by market assets divided by book total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total book assets. Size is the natural 
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logarithm of total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. Asset Growth is calculated as total asset change from year t 
to year t+1 divided by the total assets in year t. CapEx/AT is total capital expenditure divided by total assets. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4.8 presents the results of multivariate regression for the whole 
sample (Panel A) and two subsamples (Panel B), respectively. To examine the 
effects of rating initiations on firm asset growth and investments, I change the 
dependent variable to asset growth and capital expenditures in Equation (4). 
To study the impact on operating earnings and profitability, I change the 
dependent variable to the log value of EBITDA and EBITDA divided by total 
assets. The coefficients of Event year in columns 1 and 6 of Panel B show that 
the increase in asset growth is 21.9% (5.3%) immediately after a firm 
disclosing a speculative-grade (investment-grade) rating. For the test results 
with capital expenditures, Event year also has a significantly positive 
coefficient for both subsamples, though not economically significant. The 
results in column 3 show that firms experience a significant increase of 8.7% 
in earnings after initiating with speculative-grade credit rating. For firms with 
initial rating of investment-grade, the change in earnings is not significant. To 
summarize, both the multivariate regression results and univariate statistical 
analysis reveal that firms benefit from disclosing “bad” ratings to public, in 
terms of increase in asset growth and earnings.  
 Taken together, this set of evidence suggests that firms benefit from 
initiating unfavorable crediting ratings through increasing their asset growth, 
engaging in more capital expenditures, generating more operating profits, and 
maintaining constant profitability ratios. 
4.7 Robustness Test: Credit Rating Initiation during and after Global 
Financial Crisis 
The time period covered in my study include the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
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in 2007-2008, when the credit rating agencies’ reputation suffers from the 
most serious attacks. After GFC, the outcome of initiating a credit rating or not 
for a firm could be different than before. As the reliability of credit ratings is 
getting doubtful since GFC, it is not clear whether firms still can benefit from 
rating initiations or not. In my sample the number of firms that initiate credit 
ratings in and after 2007 is 95. This is only about 5% of the whole sample. 
Therefore, my results could be driven by the other 95%, that is, the firms that 
disclose their initial ratings before 2007.  
 To see whether my empirical results still hold for rating initiations after 
GFC, I carry out the same test in Session 4.4 and 4.5 using a subsample of 
firms that disclose their initial credit rating in and after 2007. Table 4.9 and 
4.10 present the leverage ratio and debt issuance change before and after 
rating initiation. For firms with speculative-grade initial ratings, they still 
experience 6.2% increase in book leverage ratio and 6.8% increase in market 
leverage ratio, significant at 5% level. For firms with investment-grade initial 
ratings, the increase in book leverage is 7.2%, with a statistical significant at 
10%, while market leverage change is not significant. Debt issuance change 
and net debt issuance change for firms with speculative-grade ratings after 
rating disclosure is 10% and 6.4%, respectively, all significant at 1% level. 
However, for the firms with investment-grade initial ratings, the increase in 




Table 4. 9 Credit rating initiation and leverage ratio---post GFC 
  All Initiations   Speculative Grade   Investment Grade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 


























     
 
    
 
    
Post_initiation 0.086*** 0.065*** 0.127*** 0.050*** 
 
0.095*** 0.062** 0.163*** 0.068** 
 
0.065** 0.071* 0.055** 0.033 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.025) (0.022) 
M/B  -0.018  -0.056*** 
 
 -0.018  -0.067*** 
 
 -0.025  -0.032** 
 
 (0.012)  (0.016) 
 
 (0.015)  (0.023) 
 
 (0.015)  (0.014) 
Size  0.005  0.054** 
 
 0.018  0.058** 
 
 -0.043  0.004 
 
 (0.022)  (0.022) 
 
 (0.025)  (0.027) 
 
 (0.042)  (0.023) 
Profitability  -0.375**  -0.364** 
 
 -0.513***  -0.382** 
 
 -0.037  -0.383** 
 
 (0.155)  (0.161) 
 
 (0.163)  (0.188) 
 
 (0.244)  (0.178) 
Tangible  0.136  0.544*** 
 
 0.163  0.521*** 
 
 0.087  0.489* 
 
 (0.178)  (0.164) 
 
 (0.193)  (0.184) 
 
 (0.265)  (0.254) 
Constant 0.251*** 0.256 0.210*** -0.161 
 
0.296*** 0.223 0.244*** -0.120 
 
0.142*** 0.552 0.134*** 0.144 
 
(0.011) (0.197) (0.011) (0.192) 
 
(0.013) (0.214) (0.014) (0.222) 
 
(0.018) (0.411) (0.015) (0.246) 
              
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 575 542 543 542 
 
406 376 376 376 
 
169 166 167 166 
R-squared 0.098 0.177 0.176 0.370 
 
0.099 0.215 0.222 0.410 
 
0.108 0.143 0.088 0.312 
No. of firms 95 95 95 95  70 70 70 70   25 25 25 25 
Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms 
that disclose their initial credit rating in and after 2007. Observations with missing values in the control variables are dropped. The dependent 
variable is either Book Leverage or Market Leverage. Book Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total book assets. Market Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to the total market assets. Post_initiation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year that the observation occurs is in or 
after the year that firms disclose their first credit rating and 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by market assets 
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divided by book total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangible is 
the total net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4. 10 Credit rating initiation and debt issuance activity---post GFC 
  All Initiations   Speculative Grade   Investment Grade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 


























     
 
    
 
    
Event Year 0.092*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.058*** 
 
0.118*** 0.100*** 0.081*** 0.064*** 
 
0.035 0.045 0.045** 0.047** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) 
M/B  0.018  0.013* 
 
 0.011  0.011 
 
 0.029  0.014 
 
 (0.016)  (0.008) 
 
 (0.018)  (0.009) 
 
 (0.020)  (0.012) 
Size  0.034*  0.027** 
 
 0.034  0.031** 
 
 0.039  0.017 
 
 (0.018)  (0.012) 
 
 (0.021)  (0.015) 
 
 (0.023)  (0.015) 
Profitability  -0.247  -0.240*** 
 
 -0.548***  -0.355*** 
 
 0.549**  0.069 
 
 (0.175)  (0.082) 
 
 (0.145)  (0.111) 
 
 (0.207)  (0.063) 
Tangible  0.194  -0.184* 
 
 0.302  -0.166 
 
 -0.256**  -0.195* 
 
 (0.216)  (0.104) 
 
 (0.236)  (0.116) 
 
 (0.108)  (0.110) 
Constant 0.143*** -0.158 0.015*** -0.138 
 
0.178*** -0.088 0.016*** -0.125 
 
0.056*** -0.371 0.013** -0.137 
 
(0.005) (0.157) (0.004) (0.106) 
 
(0.006) (0.166) (0.005) (0.120) 
 
(0.009) (0.238) (0.005) (0.150) 
               
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 556 527 543 514 
 
395 367 387 359 
 
161 160 156 155 
R-squared 0.057 0.073 0.072 0.105 
 
0.077 0.129 0.076 0.125 
 
0.014 0.107 0.079 0.106 
No. of firms 95 95 95 95   70 70 70 70   25 25 25 25 
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Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms 
that disclose their initial credit rating in and after 2007. Observations with missing values in the control variables are dropped. The dependent 
variable is either Debt Issuance or Net DebtIss. Debt Issuance is the long-term debt issuance divided by total assets. Net DebtIss is defined as 
long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction as percentage of total assets. Event year is a dummy variable that is equal to 1for all 
observations in the year of or one year after credit rating initiation, and equals to 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by 
market assets divided by book total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. 
Tangible is the total net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4.11 shows the results of change in asset growth, investment, and 
profitability after firms disclosing their initial credit rating in and after 2007. 
Panel B and Panel C present results for speculative-grade subsample and 
investment-grade subsample separately. For firms with speculative-grade 
initial ratings, their asset growth increase by 20.9%, significant at 5% level. 
However, this effect disappears within the investment-grade subsample. Both 
two subsamples experience significant increase in firm size. Neither 
speculative-grade subsample nor investment-grade subsample experience any 
significant change in capital expenditure, earning, and profitability after rating 
initiations post GFC. 
Table 4. 11 Credit rating initiation and asset growth, investment, and 
profitability---post GFC 
Panel A All Initiations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Asset growth CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability 
      
Event Year 0.168** -0.000    
 (0.072) (0.004)    
Post_initiation   0.025 0.439*** 0.001 
   (0.051) (0.072) (0.009) 
M/B 0.061 0.007 0.104*** -0.241*** 0.020*** 
 (0.080) (0.004) (0.032) (0.053) (0.005) 
Book Leverage -1.072** 0.030 -0.295 0.028 -0.095* 
 (0.438) (0.023) (0.266) (0.265) (0.053) 
Profitability -0.988 0.036  0.334  
 (0.817) (0.052)  (0.468)  
Size 0.330*** -0.009 0.912***  0.006 
 (0.089) (0.007) (0.063)  (0.008) 
Constant -1.930*** 0.101** -1.564*** 7.680*** 0.078 
 (0.734) (0.050) (0.478) (0.133) (0.061) 
      
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 461 542 514 543 543 
R-squared 0.061 0.054 0.552 0.410 0.125 
No. of firms 95 95 94 95 95 
 
Panel B Speculative Grade 
 Speculative Grade  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
VARIABLES Asset growth CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability  
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Event Year 0.209** -0.000     
 (0.101) (0.006)     
Post_initiation   0.026 0.500*** -0.006  
   (0.065) (0.098) (0.011)  
M/B 0.048 0.008 0.095** -0.253*** 0.021***  
 (0.106) (0.006) (0.041) (0.065) (0.007)  
Book Leverage -1.363** 0.043 -0.349 0.161 -0.095  
 (0.551) (0.028) (0.341) (0.308) (0.062)  
Profitability -1.177 0.021  0.837   
 (1.144) (0.063)  (0.603)   
Size 0.339*** -0.012 0.942***  0.013  
 (0.110) (0.008) (0.072)  (0.010)  
Constant -1.579* 0.127** -1.767*** 7.024*** 0.034  
 (0.868) (0.052) (0.508) (0.169) (0.068)  
       
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y  
Observations 317 376 355 376 376  
R-squared 0.072 0.069 0.574 0.420 0.142  
No. of firms 70 70 69 70 70  
 
Panel C Investment Grade 
  Investment Grade 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES  Asset growth CapEx/AT Ln(EBITDA) Size Profitability 
       
Event Year  0.109 -0.002    
  (0.098) (0.004)    
Post_initiation    0.049 0.340*** 0.017 
    (0.090) (0.098) (0.015) 
M/B  0.102 0.004 0.114** -0.214** 0.015** 
  (0.109) (0.003) (0.045) (0.091) (0.006) 
Book Leverage  -0.187 -0.011 -0.272 -0.545* -0.108 
  (0.266) (0.024) (0.282) (0.310) (0.084) 
Profitability  -0.570 0.124  -0.871  
  (0.768) (0.078)  (0.619)  
Size  0.287* 0.006 0.782***  -0.024* 
  (0.144) (0.011) (0.105)  (0.013) 
Constant  -2.440 -0.047 -0.415 9.156*** 0.323*** 
  (1.467) (0.099) (0.898) (0.232) (0.115) 
       
Firm FEs  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  144 166 159 167 167 
R-squared  0.041 0.105 0.472 0.462 0.123 
No. of firms  25 25 25 25 25 
Notes: this table presents the firm-fixed-effect OLS regression results. The 
sample consists of all the S&P’s rating initiations of US public firms that 
disclose their initial credit rating in and after 2007. Observations with missing 
values in the control variables are dropped. The dependent variables are the 
measures of asset growth, investment, earning, size, and profitability. Event 
year is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all observations in the year of 
or one year after credit rating initiation, and equals to 0 otherwise. 
Post_initiation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year that the 
observation occurs is in or after the year that firms disclose their first credit 
rating and 0 otherwise. M/B is market-to-book ratio which is calculated by 
market assets divided by book total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of total 
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debt to the total book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Profitability is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets. Asset Growth is 
calculated as total asset change from year t to year t+1 divided by the total 
assets in year t. CapEx/AT is total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  
Overall, these results imply that even after the financial crisis in 2007 and 
2008, firms that choose to disclose their “bad” credit ratings still can benefit 
from their decisions. They experience significant improvement in debt 
financing and asset growth following their rating initiations.  
4.8 Conclusion 
This study examines whether firms benefit from unfavorable (i.e., 
speculative-grade) credit ratings. Using a large sample of S&P’s corporate 
credit rating initiations from 1951 to 2012, I find significant and negative 
stock market reactions with an average cumulative abnormal return of -2.1% 
around the initiation date of a speculative-grade rating. Given the costs on 
equity value of speculative-grade rating initiations, I further examine firms’ 
debt financing, capital investments, and operating performance to see whether 
they benefit from disclosing their unfavorable ratings. I find that these firms 
engage in more debt financing and experience an increase in leverage ratio 
after the credit rating initiations. In addition to the benefits on debt financing, I 
find that these firms experience a rapid growth in total assets, capital 
expenditures, and earnings, while the profitability ratio remain constant after 
the rating initiations.  
My study contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. First, it 
contributes to the line of research on the economic role of issuer credit rating. 
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While prior studies focus on the economic role credit rating watchlist (e.g., 
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), Bannier and Hirsch (2010)), my study 
examines the costs and benefits of issuer credit rating initiations. I provide 
new evidence on the real effects of unfavorable issuer credit rating initiations. 
Second, my study contributes to the literature on the information content of 
credit ratings. Different from studies on market reactions of credit rating level 
changes such as downgrades and upgrades (e.g., Hand, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich (1992), Kliger and Sarig (2000)), my study directly examines the 
stock market reactions of firms’ initiating credit ratings. My evidence shows 
that the lower the initial credit rating level, the worse the stock market 
reactions.   
Overall, my study provides new insights on firms’ decision to disclose a 
corporate credit rating. There are both significant costs and benefits for firms 
to initiate speculative-grade credit ratings. On the one hand, these firms 
experience negative stock market reactions. On the other hand, they benefit 
from rating initiations through raising more capital through debt financing, 
faster asset growth, higher capital investments, and greater operating profits. 
My evidence helps to understand why so many firms choose to disclose credit 
ratings even though their ratings are unfavorable. REIT managers may benefit 
more from these results than other that of other firms since they have higher 
demands on debt financing. 
 One limitation of this study is that I only examine the group of firms that 
has initiated public credit rating during the observation period. It would be 
interesting to compare the difference between the firms that I focus on and the 
firms that have solicited credit rating service, but choose to keep the ratings 
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confidential or private. This will help to explore the reason of why firms 
disclose their credit ratings, especially for firms with unfavorable ratings. 
However, the identification information for the firms with private ratings is 
protected by credit rating agencies and thus is not available. This means it is 
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Variable Definitions in Chapter 3. 
Variable Definition 
Acq/TAt Aggregate contractual gross sales price of properties purchased 
by the end of each fiscal period divided by total assets within year 
t 
Aget Firm age at year t 
Betat Daily beta over a 250-trading-day holding period 
CLDt Credit line drawn/Available (%) 
Debt_ratiot Debt at year t/debt at year t-1 
Disp/TAt-1 Aggregate contractual gross sales price of properties sold by the 
end of each fiscal period divided by total assets within year t-1 
DPSt Dividends per share at end of year t 
EPTRt-1 Effective property tax rate: taxes expense on real estate assets/net 
real estate investment at year t-1 
FFO/TAt Funds from operations/total assets at year t 
HHIt Herfindahl–Hirschman index calculated using property-level 
geographic data at year t 
Index_rett End of period SNL broad base index value of year t 
Intcovt Interest coverage ratio: EBITDA/Interest Expense at year t 
Leveraget Debt as a percent of total market capitalization at year t (%) 
LN(TA)t The natural logarithm of total assets of year t 
NOI/TAt Net operation income/total assets of year t 
Ratingt Long-term credit rating of Standard & Poor’s at the end of year t 
ROAAt Return on average assets of year t 
 
 
